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This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, 
comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines 
tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper 
names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their 
competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper 
argues that the name-bearing relation – which predicativists cite to account for the properties 
that they take names to express – depends on acts of naming with a semantic significance. 
Acts of naming create particular words specifically designed for referential use, which they 
perform whether or not the language has other words articulated with the same sound or 
orthography. Like other forms of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view affords 
reponses to Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism. The view is 
prima facie more complex than predicativism; but the additional complexity is independently 
attested in natural languages and well motivated. Finally, the Mill-Frege proposal deals well 
with Kripke’s modal argument, and accounts for modal intuitions about names, both issues 
that pose serious trouble to predicativism.  
 
 
1. Introduction: the Mill-Frege view 
 
In this paper I elaborate an account of the semantics of proper names and argue that it 
compares favorably with related predicativist views that have recently become prominent. I 
call the account the Mill-Frege theory because it combines tenets of Fregean views with 
central features of the theory of direct reference. The view has two constitutive theses. First, 
proper names contribute their referents to the contents of the primary speech acts they help 
performing, and are thus rigid designators; this makes the view Millian. Second, proper 
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names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their 
competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions; this makes it Fregean. The theory thus 
rejects strict Millianism, as defined here: “According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak, 
simply a name. It simply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, 
unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special 
identifying properties” (Kripke 1979, 239-240). What’s perhaps surprising about the Mill-
Frege view is that its Millian side is compatible with core Fregean tenets. 
The debate between Millians and Fregeans on the semantics of singular terms hinges on 
the following dividing issue. For Fregeans, a correct semantic account of singular terms 
cannot associate with them only a referent. It must, in addition, associate with them a 
property that counts as a Fregean mode of presentation: known to competent speakers, and 
reasonably taken as individuative.1 The linguistic competence with singular terms of someone 
who has mastered a language, in other words, cannot be captured only by mentioning his 
knowledge of the term’s reference – unless this knowledge is characterized as constitutively 
involving some mode of presentation. Fregeans have defended further claims in addition to 
this. In particular, predicativists such as Bach (1987, 2002), Elbourne (2005), Geurts (1997), 
Katz (1994, 2001), Matushansky (2008) and Fara (2015) assume that referential names and a 
definite description capturing their sense are synonymous: substitutable everywhere salva 
significatione. Katz assumes further that Fregean senses are associated with types, rather than 
with tokens. Others, like Searle (1983), add internalism to the core Fregean view.  
This paper is intended to contribute to a defense of the core Fregean claim, without any 
such additions. The issue on which the debate turns is not whether singular terms get 
associated with descriptive material. The name ‘New York’, for example, connotes that there 
was a place bearing the name ‘York’ that the new city was named after.2 The issue is whether 
the association is semantic, whether a semantic theory would be incomplete without capturing 
it. None of the following points are in dispute in the debate between Fregeans and Millians: 
(i) there is some explanation for why a given singular term refers to a given individual; (ii) it 
often has to do with properties of the referent, known by the speakers, and (iii) it belongs in a 
theory of language, broadly considered.3  
Millians (cf. e.g. Soames 2005, 183) contend that their opponents confuse two different 
kinds of explanation, ‘semantic’ explanations answering ‘descriptive questions’ and 
‘metasemantic’ explanations answering ‘foundational questions’.4 The former aim to provide 
a compositional account of how the meanings of sentences (in context) are determined out of 
the contributions of their relevant parts and the way they are put together. The latter answer 
instead questions ‘about what the facts are that give expressions their semantic values, or 
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more generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular 
individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics’ (Stalnaker 1997, 535). In his 
earlier work, Kaplan classified core features of the means by which the referents of indexicals 
are determined (their characters) as belonging to semantics (Kaplan 1989, p. 575).5  
This paper defends the moderate Fregeanism contained in the core Fregean thesis. It is not 
part of the view that the referent is not linguistically essential; on the contrary, on the present 
view referents are meaning-constitutive. It is not part of the view that sense and reference are 
ascribed to types; on the contrary, they are to be ascribed to contextualized expressions, i.e., 
tokens. Finally, it is not part of the view that a singular term is synonymous with a description 
capturing its sense. In the phrase introduced by Kripke, the view is rather one according to 
which descriptive senses fix the referents of the terms with which they are associated. The 
view still counts as Fregean, in that it asserts the Fregean core. As Kripke (1980, p. 33) 
correctly points out, this poses a challenge: to explain how, if descriptions capturing senses 
are not synonymous with singular terms, the relation between the latter and the former is still 
semantic; and to explain how this descriptive material can contribute, as the Fregean claims, 
to the truth-conditions of singular existentials, identity statements, indirect discourse and so 
on. The presuppositional side of the view is intended to address this fair challenge. 
This is the plan for the remainder of the paper. In §2 I classify varieties of metalinguistic 
descriptivism: first, I distinguish predicativism from referentialism, in that the former but not 
the latter takes names in referential uses to be predicates – constituents of the referring 
expressions – exactly like those explicitly used as predicates; second, I distinguish indexical 
from non-indexical referentialism, in that the former but not the latter agree with 
predicativists that David Hume and David Lewis bear the same (‘generic’) name. In §3 I 
outline a presuppositional view of referential expressions. On this view, they contribute their 
referents to the contents of the main speech acts that they help to create, while still making a 
descriptive contribution to a different semantically conveyed feature, a presupposition. In §4 I 
characterize the acts of naming on which the descriptive component of the semantics of 
proper names rely on the Mill-Frege view, and in §5 the presuppositions they help to convey. 
In §6 I make several objections to the view that ‘generic’ names occur in referential uses, 
shared by predicativism and indexical referentialism. Finally, §7 explains how predicative 




2. Metalinguistic descriptivism and its varieties 
 
The Mill-Frege account is a version of the metalinguistic descriptivism that Kripke (1980, 
68-74) criticizes as circular.6 In this section I’ll classify along two dimensions views that 
share this feature, including predicativism, a view initially advanced by Sloat (1969) and 
Burge (1973) that has gained momentum recently through the work of Geurts (1997), 
Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008), Fara (2015) and others.  
Predicativists call our attention to predicative uses of names (PU henceforth), as in (2)-(4), 
in which they behave like ordinary predicates, in contrast with ordinary referential uses (RU) 
as in (1) below, in which they intuitively refer to individuals: 
(1)  Alfred studies in Princeton. 
(2)  There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. 
(3) An Alfred Russell joined the club today. 
(4) The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon. 
Predicativism is the view that names uniformly have the semantic value of predicates (say, 
they express properties) in all uses, PU and RU alike. When they occur in referential 
positions as in (1), they are also predicates occurring as arguments of a covert determiner, a 
suppressed demonstrative (Burge 1973) or definite description (Elbourne 2005, Matushansky 
2008, Fara 2015a). Which property do they express? To answer this, Fara (2015a, 64) appeals 
to the Being Called Condition, (BCC): 
(BCC) When used as a predicate, ‘N’ is true of a thing just in case it is called N. 
Note that ‘N’ as it occurs after ‘called’ in (BCC) is not mentioned, but used. Following 
Matushansky, Fara (2015a, 65-9) argues persuasively that ‘called o N’, ‘named o N’ and 
‘dubbed o N’ are ‘small clauses’, not constructions with a ditransitive verb and two objects.7 
How should we understand the predicate being called N, or the related ones that occur in such 
clauses? When replaced by a proper name in instances of the schema, ‘N’ must be understood 
metalinguistically: it is to be a bearer of ‘N’, to have ‘N’ as a name.8 When it comes to 
account for how proper names work in RU, predicativism is thus one more proposal in the 
metalinguistic descriptivism family. Such accounts have in common that they deal with 
Kripke’s (1980) objections to descriptivism by substituting metalinguistic descriptions (the 
bearer of the name ‘Aristotle’) for “famous deeds” descriptions (‘the disciple of Plato, author 
of the Metaphysics’). I will now classify them relative to two criteria. 
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First, predicativists take names to be always predicates, while referentialists take them to 
be specific referential expressions in RU – either indexicals, or words in a category of their 
own. Second, commoners individuate name-words so that David Lewis and David Hume 
share the first name, while properists individuate them so that they have two different names 
articulated with the same spelling and pronunciation.9 Kaplan (1990) introduced a convenient 
terminology: generic names are individuated by their sound/spelling; specific names, by a 
historical event – a dubbing or act of naming.10 Commoners take generic names to be the 
words employed in all uses of proper names. Properists take specific names instead to be the 
words used in RU, true proper names; on this view, the first names of Lewis and Hume are 
homonyms. We thus have two orthogonal distinctions, allowing for the following taxonomy. 
First, some theorists are commoner predicativists.11 Others are commoner referentialists.12 
Like Kripke’s and Kaplan’s, the Mill-Frege view is a form of properist referentialism.13 In 
principle there could be a properist predicativistm; but the relevant predicates would apply at 
most to one individual, and hence it is difficult to find empirical motivation for it, given that 
an account of most predicative uses would anyway be needed.14 
A main difference between referentialists and predicativists lies in that the former 
recognize two different words in the case of names – those that occur in RU and those in PU 
– where the latter just see one. Predicativists thus deploy a methodological argument for their 
view.15 They contend that it affords a more systematic, simpler or more unified account of 
how proper names work in ordinary uses such as (1)-(4).16 Several writers have given a 
convincing rejoinder to this argument.17 They first point out other examples of uses of proper 
names as predicates, which cannot be explained by appealing to (BCC), such as: 
(2ʹ)  There are relatively few Picassos in Barcelona’s Picasso Museum. 
(3ʹ) An Obama came to the Halloween party. 
(4ʹ) (At Madame Tussaud): The Hepburn is an amazing piece of work. 
Some of these examples – they then go on to argue – can be accounted for pragmatically, 
perhaps as metonymical ‘meaning transfers’ (Nunberg, 1995) from referential uses; some 
others semantically, perhaps as conventionalized, lexicalized results of such processes, or 
other forms of polysemy. A similar account could be given for predicative uses of proper 
names that rely on (BCC); I will provide my own version in §7. Hence, facile appeals to 
simplicity lack any force. A full account of natural languages should anyway encompass the 
processes just mentioned, also in cases involving proper names. Hence, no decrease of 
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simplicity or unneeded complexity will manifestly result from appealing to them to account 
for (2)-(4) on behalf of referentialist views. 
This is not, of course, an argument for referentialism, but only a rejoinder to an argument 
that has been made against it. In this paper I’ll outline some threads in a full argument for the 
Mill-Frege version of properist referentialism to be presented in §§4-5; the argument in full, 
which cannot be given here, should consist in a global comparison of the explanatory virtues 
of the alternatives. I’ll just mention an important motivation for metalinguistic descriptivism 
(cf. Hornsby 1976, 229, Katz 2001, 139), without details. Not recognizing the validity of the 
following inferences prima facie disqualifies one as a competent speaker of English: 
(5) He is hungry. 
      ∴ Some male is hungry 
(6) Peter is hungry. 
      ∴ Someone called Peter/some Peter is hungry 
Competent speakers also recognize the trifling character of the following sentences: 
(7) He is male, if he exists. 
(8) Peter is called Peter/a Peter, if he exists. 
While these arguments are not necessarily truth-preserving, on the view to be outlined 
below they are truth-preserving across felicitous contexts: some adequate adaptation of 
Kaplan’s (1989) validity in the logic of demonstratives to the presuppositional framework 
outlined in the next section. Roughly, the conclusion would be true in any context in which 
the presuppositional requirements of the premises are met and are also true. 
 
 
3. Reference-fixing: the presuppositional account  
 
An adequate Fregean account of names should answer a legitimate demand after the 
alleged conventional senses for, say, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are: “Are not these just two names 
(in English) for the same man? Is there any special conventional, community-wide 
‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other?” (Kripke 1979, 244) The challenge is to provide 
descriptive material that can be plausibly taken to be semantically associated with proper 
names, over and above their referents. As announced, I’ll address this challenge by resorting 
to metalinguistic conditions such as being called Cicero and being called Tully.18 In this 
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section I’ll present the idea, and I’ll show how it addresses Millian challenges by briefly 
discussing the in my view related case of indexicals. 
An influential argument for Millianism is modal: unlike descriptions, names are ‘rigid 
designators’. Now, many writers have noticed that this point by itself cannot establish the 
Millian view, because expressions that are semantically associated with descriptive material 
are also similarly rigid: indexicals, descriptions in some uses, and artificially devised 
descriptions rigidified by means of ‘actual’ or ‘dthat’ operators.19 In previous work I have 
developed a version of this suggestion, focusing on the case of indexicals.20 Two aspects of 
this particular version of the reply are important for our discussion; I will sum them up.  
Firstly, there are general linguistic rules conventionally associated with indexicals along 
the lines of Kaplan’s (1989) characters; here are two examples: 
‘I’:  For any use I of ‘I’, I refers to x iff x is the utterer of I. 
‘He’:  For any use he of ‘he’, he refers to x iff x is the male ‘demonstrated’ when he is 
produced.21  
Reference is here assigned to concrete (actual or possible) uses in accordance with the 
linguistic rule for the types they instantiate. Moreover, there is a relational property involving 
any use, given the general features mentioned in the rule for its type (say, whoever uttered I, 
assuming now that the bold-face instance of ‘I’ refers to a particular use), which has the 
required features to count as a Fregean sense: it is reasonably individuative, and it is mutually 
known on the basis of linguistic knowledge alone. In most cases, this mode of presentation 
will include features obtained from context. In some cases, contextual supplementation may 
even be mandatory for understanding. In all cases the use-involving mode of presentation 
associated with a use is linguistically constrained or guided. Thus, another conventional rule 
for indexicals could be as follows: 
‘That’: For any use that of ‘that’, that refers to x iff x is the unique entity (in a contextually 
specified class Φ) ‘demonstrated’ when that is produced.  
This puts aside of a possible ‘Millian’ view of indexicals that rejects for them the Fregean 
core. Surely, the Millian claim cannot be that the truth-conditional contribution of singular 
terms in natural language is usually not fixed by modes of presentation associated with their 
types solely by linguistic conventions.22 Many researchers accept that this applies across the 
board: linguistic conventions only constrain or guide truth-conditional imports; their full 
determination depends on contextual features. Linguistic conventions restrict quantifiers to a 
certain domain, but the specific domain is usually only fully given contextually; likewise, 
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linguistic conventions determine that attributive adjectives and adverbs (‘old’, ‘bad’, etc) 
qualify only relative to a given scale, which is only contextually given; and so on. 
The second trait of my suggestions for answering modal argument is the specific way in 
which I proposed to incorporate direct reference. Direct reference theorists characterize the 
contribution of (a use of) ‘he’ to the truth-conditions asserted by means of an utterance of ‘he 
is rich’ as an individual which is a component of a ‘singular proposition’, encapsulating its 
possible-world truth-conditions. My proposal agrees: the contribution to asserted content of 
an indexical like ‘he’ should be abstracted away from the way that entity is presented. But 
there is in my view an additional reference-fixing element associated with singular terms, 
over and above its contribution to the signified proposition. I have argued that this reference-
fixing aspect constitutes a lexically triggered presupposition (García-Carpintero 2000a, 2006) 
– say, that x is the ‘demonstrated’ male when the token he is produced. 
Although the state of information we end up in by accepting that ‘John stole the camera’ 
and ‘it was John who stole the camera’ are the same, these two sentences pack the 
information they convey in different ways. The second, cleft sentence presupposes that 
someone stole the camera, but the former, plainer sentence does not. For present purposes, we 
can think of presuppositions along the well-known lines that Stalnaker (1978, 2014) has 
suggested.23 Speech acts like assertions take place relative to a common ground, a set of 
already accepted propositions. Linguistic presuppositions are requirements on the common 
ground, whose satisfaction should be checked before acceptance of the resulting assertion is 
assessed. If accepted, it goes to conform the common ground, licensing further 
presuppositions in the ensuing discourse. The difference between the sentences lies in the fact 
that an utterance of the it-cleft sentence will feel inappropriate at presupposition evaluation 
time (Stalnaker 2002) if it is not common ground by then that someone stole the camera. But 
the state of information that we get into by accepting either of our sentences will be the same.  
Consider an utterance of ‘he is hungry’. As indicated, the proposal agrees with the direct 
reference theorists that the asserted content is a singular proposition, x is hungry, for some 
contextual assignment to x. It is expressed, however, in a context in which another singular 
proposition is presupposed which, given the general rule above, we could express thus: x is 
the male ‘demonstrated’ when he is produced.24 These semantically triggered presuppositions 
are about linguistic expressions.25 They will usually be supplemented with additional features 
of the referent, perceptually accessible or accessible from previous discourse. The descriptive 
identification thus presupposed is hence ‘reference-fixing’ and not ‘meaning-giving’.  
This is not a reductive view: far from aiming to reduce singular contents to general ones, it 
assumes primitively singular representations. The suggestion is only that general descriptive 
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information that helps to fix which individuals an utterance is about is among its semantically 
constitutive features. This information figures in ancillary presuppositions. But the 
presuppositions are themselves singular, and not just because they may mention singular 
representations; the intended referents, if there are any, contribute to individuating their 
contents. Singularity, like presuppositionality, is here understood as a constitutive feature of 
the representational devices, a ‘semantic requirement’ (Fine 2007, 50) on them – a fact to be 
embedded in a theory of such representations, which must be grasped for them to be fully 
comprehended.26 It is thus that singular terms are de jure rigid, in Kripke’s (1980) sense.27  
There are two other arguments for Millianism. First, a semantic or error argument, that 
speakers use instances of a name to refer to an object even if the descriptions they associate 
with the name in fact identify a different object. Second, an epistemic or ignorance argument, 
that speakers competently use a name to refer to an object even if they ignore that it satisfies 
the alleged descriptions. In the case of indexicals they are not compelling. An error argument 
could not be persuasively mounted about descriptive material like our relational properties. 
Similarly, an epistemic argument is not obviously applicable. The claim that utterances along 
the lines of he is a male relevant when he is produced, if there is such a male are known on 
the basis of linguistic competence is at least not obviously disposed of.28 
In order to extend to proper names the strategy that the two points just outlined allow for 
indexicals, what is needed is some analogously reference-fixing material that is associated 
with proper names in a sufficiently ‘linguistic’ way. The next two sections are devoted to this 
goal: to characterize the linguistic senses of proper names in the outlined framework. 
 
 
4. Acts of naming and appellative practices  
 
Millians contend that proper names lack semantically associated Fregean senses. Any 
related descriptive material shows up only in metasemantic explanations. The Fregean view I 
defend claims in contrast that there is a Fregean sense associated with uses of proper names, 
which is part of a semantically triggered presupposition. An illusion that there are no such 
senses is explained by the fact that their semantic core is informatively meager. Mill, and 
more recently Marcus (1961) and others appreciated a peculiarity of proper names, which 
indeed distinguishes them from other linguistic resources; it explains why they do not belong 
in dictionaries. This feature, however, does not justify the Millian claim that they refer 
without the help of a Fregean sense. A semantic theory must canvass these senses first 
because they account for some properties of utterances of ordinary sentences (as (6) and (8) 
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above seek to illustrate); and second because they contribute to the asserted proposition in 
contexts such as attitude ascription, fiction, negative existentials, and so on. 
As announced, the account to be defended is a metalinguistic proposal according to which 
the linguistic sense of proper name N is (roughly) whoever is called N. The proposal agrees to 
that extent with causal descriptivist views anticipated by Kripke, which turn his outline of a 
picture of how the reference of names is fixed into a form of descriptivism.29 In this section I 
articulate the concept of being called N that the Mill-Frege view assumes. I’ll explain how 
names are individuated on that view, as a form of properist referentialism. I will argue on the 
basis of ‘Madagascar’-like cases that the acts of naming that individuate names have a 
semantic and not merely an institutional, social character, in a sense to be explained. This will 
play a crucial role in an argument in §6.4 against commonerism, both referentialists and 
predicativists. In §5 I will present the reference-fixing presuppositions in which names thus 
individuated figure, and I will address circularity worries.  
 
4.1 Acts of naming and their semantic role 
I start by describing a subset of the conventions constituting natural languages, which I 
call appellative practices, instituted by means of speech acts which I call acts of naming. The 
proposal is similar to the most fully elaborated account of these practices so far, due to 
Sainsbury; it is closer to Sainsbury’s (2005, 106-124) earlier view than to his (2015) more 
recent one, although it differs substantively from both, as I’ll explain.  
Following Kripke, views of this kind individuate practices by an originating event, a 
dubbing or act of naming, and causal links leading to it involving deferential intentions to 
established usage by those who acquire the name. The originating events are speech acts like 
assertions, commands, questions, promises and so on.30 I take them to be in core cases 
stipulations – acts in the genus of directives, requests or pleas to assign meanings to lexical 
units and to subsequently use them in agreement with that assignment.31 They have the role of 
definitions: to endow an expression with a conventional meaning, for this to serve as a ground 
on which subsequent uses of the same expression to make other speech acts rely. They are 
perfectly common; I performed some a few pages above, when I wrote ‘(BCC)’, ‘(1)’ and 
similar expressions before some sentence-types, to be able to refer to them in acts such as the 
ensuing assertions I made about them.  
Many other lexical units are endowed with meaning in similar ways: adjective words, 
common nouns, etc. But there is a crucial difference between acts of naming and appellative 
practices relating to proper names, and those for predicates, which I’ll explain in §4.2 below; 
as I’ll put it, the former introduce purely nominal practices. Acts of naming adopt many 
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forms, but I will assume a regimented, canonical one: N is …, or let us/we will call … N. Acts 
of naming can be descriptive, for instance in the case of theoretical terms: in this case, the 
ellipsis in the schema above will be filled up with a description. They can also be ostensive, 
in the case of terms whose semantic value can be reliably identified observationally. In this 
case, the ellipsis in N is … is to be replaced with a demonstrative and a demonstration 
towards a (spatio-temporal stage of) the referent (in the case of singular terms), a paradigm 
case of the property (in the case of adjectives) or the kind (in the case of common nouns).32 
Like other speech acts, acts of naming are concrete events. They are purposeful events, 
instituting specific linguistic conventions, appellative practices. As is generally the case with 
purposeful activities, attempted acts of naming can be dysfunctional, failed (Austinian 
abuses) or merely putative (misfires). We individuate the acts by describing their felicity 
conditions, under which they would be performed successfully. Acts of naming are directives 
intended to grant permissions to members of the relevant linguistic community to use the 
name in the subsequent acts constituting the thereby created practice.33 Their constitutive goal 
is to coordinate acts of (speaker-)reference (Kripke 1977) to an object. If they are successful, 
it becomes the semantic referent of the thereby created name. This assumes that the notion of 
(speaker-)reference is explanatorily prior to that of reference by means of names. This is a 
general notion we need to understand representational acts in general.  
The account of ‘Madagascar’-like cases below relies on there being unsuccessful, 
ineffectual but nonetheless obtaining acts of naming – Austinian abuses. Let us take an 
example, a variation on one by Ziff (1977, 321). We have been debating what to call the cat 
we recently adopted; I support ‘Whiskers’, other members of my household favor ‘Flaubert’. 
A visiting friend asks, what is the new cat like? Out of the blue, I answer:  
(9) Whiskers is adorable. 
A supporter of the alternative name promptly objects: ‘hey, wait a minute, I did not know we 
had agreed on calling it Whiskers!’ The example prompts three remarks: 
 (i) The reply provides evidence for the presuppositional account articulated in §5 below. 
‘Hey, wait a minute’ objections are a standard way to challenge presuppositions, taken as a 
test for their presence.34 The utterance presupposes that the intended object is called 
Whiskers, and hence that an act of naming by which the object becomes the bearer of the 
name has taken place. The presupposition is not necessarily wrong, because the speaker is 
(cheekily) expecting that, at ‘presupposition evaluation time’ (Stalnaker 2002) after the 
utterance, it has in fact become common knowledge that the cat is called Whiskers, in virtue 
of the audience graciously accommodating him; and he may well have succeeded.35  
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(ii) Acts of naming need not explicitly occur for an appellative practice to be created. They 
might remain implicit; a way for this to happen is that speakers presuppose that they are in 
place.36 In our example, the mischievous maneuver has been undone. But how could it have 
succeeded in the first place, one might wonder? How could one make a fact to obtain just by 
presupposing that it does? This relies on the mechanism that Stalnaker (2002) has proposed to 
account for informative presuppositions, as when I utter ‘I am sorry I am late – my car broke 
down’ without assuming that previous to the utterance my audience knows that I have a car. 
Here the speaker relies on a pragmatic mechanism through which, at ‘presupposition 
evaluation time’, the audience comes to accept that the speaker has a car, thus rendering the 
presupposition felicitous. For this to work, the content should be sufficiently unexceptional 
and unquestionable; the strategy would probably not work if one utters ‘I am sorry I am late – 
my Ferrari Testarossa broke down’, meeting instead with a ‘hey, wait a minute’ objection. 
The envisaged protest against (9) is a case in point.37 However, this is not enough to answer 
the worry. The usurper doesn’t become the legitimate king just by being so powerful as to 
have everybody in the realm presupposing that he is, or making as if they did.38 
Accommodation suffices to make utterances carrying presuppositions feel felicitous, but by 
itself doesn’t make those presuppositions true. It does here, however, on account of the 
special nature of names: the purely nominal character of their appellative practices, to be 
explained momentarily. In a nutshell, all that is needed for x to bear N is for members of the 
relevant group to be willing to coordinate their representational acts so that N refers to x. 
(iii) The example illustrates how acts of naming might fail. The preparatory conditions for 
getting ‘Whiskers’ to semantically refer to the cat are in place: we are in need of a name in 
order to be able to talk about it, and that would do; the speaker is in a position to introduce a 
name for the cat. However, the refusal of the intended community to agree on using the name 
I implicitly aim to create nullifies the implicit act, so that I have failed to create one. This is a 
case of the failure of a merely implicit act of naming, but it is easy to think of analogous cases 
involving explicit acts. Thus, I assume that if I gratuitously baptize the first sentence I want to 
refer to throughout a paper with a difficult-to-remember name, my act will be equally 
unsuccessful, because this will ensure that my subsequent claims about the sentence will meet 
with readers unwilling or unable to understand them. Likewise if I use expressions that are 
taboo or insulting to name people.39 
Acts of naming might thus be unsuccessful in their constitutive aim of establishing a 
convention – endowing a name with meaning. What does the name refer to in the expression 
of the act, let us/we will call … N?40 As indicated in §2, this is a predicative use; but, as 
shown there, the name is mentioned in the characterization of the intended property. Which 
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name, however, given that there will not be any when the act fails? To put it in the Kaplanian 
terminology introduced before, what is primarily mentioned in the act of naming is a generic 
name that serves as a template for the specific one the act aims to introduce. On a pedantic 
elaboration, the directive is: let us hereby introduce a name articulated as ‘N’ for x.41 
Given that acts of naming might occur implicitly, they might also obtain inadvertently: ‘a 
parent calls a spindly child a beanpole, using the word as a common noun and with no 
intention to originate a practice, but it sticks as a nickname and for years is used as a proper 
name of a the child’ (Sainsbury 2005, 111). Or a speaker mishears an existing name, and 
inadvertently start a new referring practice with the name he uses, wrongly thinking he is just 
following established practice. The process in those cases is the one outlined above and 
discussed further below: a dubbing comes into existence just by being presumed to exist. 
I side with Sainsbury (2005), against Evans and his more recent self (2015), in thinking of 
Madagascar-like cases along these lines. The original act of naming, apparently leading to 
present-day uses of ‘Mogadishu’,42 is nullified relative to the uses in the practice to refer to 
the island. Relative to them, it becomes an ineffectual act of naming, like the one for 
‘Whiskers’ presupposed in the utterance of (9). (This, of course, doesn’t apply to those other 
uses, still obtaining, for the place for which it was originally introduced.) A new dubbing is 
instead inadvertently created, and a new appellative practice established at some 
indeterminate time.43 It is thus as when ‘Madagascar’ was used to name a 2005 film, except 
for the inadvertency. With respect to later uses down on the causal chain of deference, the 
effect of the previous ‘Madagascar’ dubbing is nullified; film uses instead depend on the new 
dubbing, whether implicit or explicit, here manifest to the speakers involved.  
In his previous work, Sainsbury (2005) invoked a Davidsonian metasemantics in support 
of this view, appealing to the Principle of Charity. Systematic uses of ‘Madagascar’ for the 
film depend on a different act of naming than systematic uses of the expression for the island, 
and hence belong in a different appellative practice. The reason is that the referent of the 
word ‘is to be judged in part in the light of how we can best make sense of a speaker’; ‘our 
verdict should not lead to a prolonged and robust divergence between speaker referent and 
semantic referent’ (Sainsbury 2005, 118). For the same reasons, systematic uses of the word 
for the island after Marco Polo’s error (or that of Renaissance cartographers partly relying on 
him, Burgess 2014, 196-7) should be thought of as depending on a different act of naming 
and as constituting a different appellative practice than those for the Somali territory.  
I am not fond of Davidsonian views on meaning-determination (García-Carpintero 2012). I 
feel closer to Williamson’s proposal (2007, 264) to replace the maximization of true beliefs 
with that of knowledge in a content-determining principle of charity. Thus, one might say that 
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utterances of declarative sentences are constitutively made to allow for the transmission of 
knowledge of their semantic contents. The assumption that our uses of ‘Madagascar’ still 
semantically refer to what uses of ‘Mogadishu’ do would excessively disrupt the knowledge-
transfer potential that uses of declarative sentences including them should have. However, to 
my mind McGlynn (2012, 398-400) convincingly shows that Williamson’s proposal is too 
blunt. Someone might be referring with ‘she’ to a demonstrated female, even if the claims 
thereby made do not constitute knowledge about her, on account of safety considerations: the 
speaker is in fact pointing to a woman, but she is surrounded by woman-appearances created 
by a hallucinogen, so that such claims (or relevant counterparts, cf. Manley (2012)) might 
easily have been false. An adequate metasemantics should instead look in more detail at the 
role that knowledge plays in the semantic rules for particular expressions. For those whose 
truth-conditional import is determined by appellative practices, I think this will lead to 
focusing on maximizing the amount among what I call analytic statements in §4.2 that 
constitute knowledge. However, the issues are too complicated for them to be usefully 
addressed here, so I will just rely on Sainsbury’s (2005) Davidsonian justification. 
Now, Sainsbury (2015) notes that Kripke’s ‘causal chain’ picture affords distinguishing 
between what makes a subsequent use one of the same name, and what makes a name retain 
its reference. He thus now says, as Evans did, that in Madagascar-like cases one and the same 
name changes its referent (ibid., 210-11). However, this ignores a semantic constitutive role 
that the previous considerations show acts of naming to have. In a nutshell: they are intended 
to introduce a word; words are individuated in part by their semantic features; names, like 
indexicals, are de jure, constitutively referential expressions, whose semantic referent is 
determined relative to what transpired at a particular act of naming.  
Sainsbury now characterizes acts of naming – which he calls ‘originating uses’ – in 
negative terms: a use is originating ‘iff it does not look back to or defer to earlier uses of any 
specific name’ (2015, 199). Thus, the use of ‘Madagascar’ for the film was an originating 
one. But the ‘Whiskers’ example above shows that this condition is insufficient: the use 
doesn’t look back to earlier ones, but it is not originating. Examples of inadvertent naming 
show that the condition is not necessary either. Sainsbury still acknowledges some of them: 
‘we must also allow for first uses which simply grow up’ (ibid., 200), mentioning a case like 
his ‘beanpole’ example quoted above. These points raise two worries: (i) why ‘must we 
allow’ for such inexplicit originating acts? And (ii) why do some cases fail to be originating, 
even if they do not look back to earlier uses? These questions should be answered; and the 
answers my discussion suggests are in tension with Sainsbury’s current view. At (i): the 
semantic referents of names depend on what was picked out at particular acts of naming, on 
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which they rely. The use of ‘Madagascar’ for the film manifestly allows for assertions that no 
sensible metasemantics should count as being about the island; but exactly the same applies 
to the relevant uses of ‘beanpole’, and to current uses of ‘Madagascar’ for the island. At (ii): 
the use of ‘Whiskers’ failed at creating a practice semantically dependent on it.44 
I conclude that acts of naming have a semantic role, not merely a social or institutional 
one: they contribute to determine the semantic values (truth-conditional imports) of uses of 
names dependent on them along deferential chains, on condition that the potential failures in 
fulfilling this role in the language that nullifies them in ‘Madagascar’-like cases are absent. 
 
4.2 The purely nominal character of appellative practices for proper names 
I move now to explain how the appellative practices related to proper names have a purely 
nominal character, in contrast with those related to predicates. I call analytic statements 
assertions typically made with the same sentences (N is …, or we call … N) used in acts of 
naming (which are not assertions). They primarily aim to explain the meaning of the 
expression-type, or to introduce someone to the relevant linguistic convention. They do that 
by giving the referent or semantic value of the expression, in circumstances that allow for the 
sense to be also conveyed.45 In the case of natural kind terms such as ‘water’, for instance, 
together with most defenders of two-dimensional intensional theories I would argue that 
being the watery stuff (i.e., the odorless, colorless, tasteless substance the fills up rivers and 
lakes and falls as rain) is an aspect of the sense of the term. I would put this in the present 
framework, developing the idea that the term contributes the natural kind it picks out to the 
‘at-issue’ content of utterances of atomic sentences in which it occurs, while it contributes its 
descriptive sense to an associated presupposition. So an adequate analytic statement for water 
could be ‘water is the watery stuff’, or ‘we call this water’, demonstrating a quantity of the 
stuff manifestly instantiating the relevant descriptive properties.  
There are thus acts of naming for common nouns exactly as for proper names, and hence 
the metalinguistic condition being called water is also an aspect of the sense of ‘water’. But 
here the condition is subordinated to being the watery stuff; something similar is typically the 
case with general terms. With names, however, the only descriptive condition that typically 
(i.e., putting aside for now descriptive names such as Evans’ ‘Julius’ and relates cases, see 
below) needs to be made salient in corresponding analytic statements is the metalinguistic 
one that there is an appellative practice for it. This is what the purely nominal character of 
these practices comes to; it reflects a feature of proper names that many researchers have 
pointed out, their being mere ‘tags’ or ‘labels’, which Strawson nicely captures here: 
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[I]t is convenient to have in circulation […] a tag, a designation, which does 
not depend for its referential or identifying force upon any particular […] 
position or relation, which preserves the same referential force through its 
object’s changes of position or relation and has the same referential force for 
communicators who know the object in different connections and for whom 
quite different descriptions would be uppermost. (Strawson 1974, p. 45-6) 
A ‘just so’ evolutionary parable might bring this out. Imagine a linguistic community of 
people who already have expressions (like ‘water’) whose reference is determined with 
regard to descriptively rich material. They also have already, to signify singular states of 
affairs, some devices for singular reference other than proper names; say, they conventionally 
use indexicals for that purpose, and they use definite descriptions referentially. Occasionally 
they find themselves in a situation where none of those recourses helps them to signify the 
singular condition they intend. Say, they are a group of biologists studying a population of 
seals, who sometimes would like to refer to a particular seal when it is not contextually 
salient in any way. Seals are too undifferentiated to bring them into the discourse by means of 
referentially used descriptions, especially if the domain contains several hundreds of them. In 
this predicament, the mechanism of appellative practices offers a way out. By making sure 
that a distinguishing physical tag with an inscription of a given type is physically attached to 
each seal in the domain, an appellative practice involving instances of that expression-type 
can be circumstantially guaranteed to succeed. 
This strategy resorts to an independently existing linguistic device, appellative practices, to 
give speakers a cognitively accessible descriptive material to signify conditions about specific 
objective individuals. Our biologists have relied, to solve their problem, upon their awareness 
that entities in the world can be circumstantially identified by the existence of certain 
linguistic acts related to them. Stereotypical traits allow entities like properties and kinds to 
be reliably identified, at least throughout particular environments; because of that, there are 
potential acts, analytic statements, in which they are authoritatively (even if fallibly) called by 
a given term, which secures an emergent, second-order metalinguistic identificatory trait for 
the property or kind. But no other individuative traits than the existence of the practice are 
involved in the seal case. In contrast with the appellative practices for ‘water’, no 
stereotypical non-linguistic material, conventionally associated with the expression-type, 
needs being made salient in making analytic statements.  
The appellative practices associated with names are thus purely nominal in that analytic 
statements have merely the job of making salient an act of naming in which the label was 
assigned to the object; what they convey is the singular information that the object is called a 
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given (specific) name. To be sure, the appellative practice in our parable is sustained by the 
fact that an inscription has been attached to each seal through its life. But this is neither here 
nor there: it is not important for the practice how analytic statements are made reliable, but 
only their very availability. It is essentially the acts of naming that play the identificatory role, 
and only accidentally the permanent labelings of seals that lead to them.46 The practice of 
referring to seals by the introduced proper names requires only that there exists some way or 
other to guarantee correct analytic statements, not any particular means for it.  
When concrete analytic statements belonging in the practice are made, speakers typically 
have a perceptual presentation of the designated seal, which individuates the animal all by 
itself. Some seal lovers may even have a fallible but reliable recognitional capacity for 
particular seals, which they may come to associate with their names. But neither transiently 
individuating perceptual presentations nor recognitional capacities are required to understand 
the names we are considering. A competent speaker will fully understand an utterance of 
‘1,237 is ill’ even if no concrete statement implementing the practice associated with this 
token of ‘1,237’ has in fact taken place, let alone one in which he himself has been present. 
And few (if any) speakers will have the imagined recognitional capacities, in spite of which 
they fully understand the names. The only piece of individuating knowledge which a 
competent speaker possesses about the seal being referred to in an utterance of ‘1,237 is ill’ is 
thus that an appellative practice involving the type ‘1,237’ has been put in place, on which the 
uttered token relies, and the seal is the individual called 1,237 in statements instantiating that 
naming practice; and this she has on the basis of her linguistic knowledge. 
It is this purely nominal character of the practices related to proper names that allows for 
the peculiarity we noticed above of the kind of accommodation that the ‘Whiskers’ speaker 
unsuccessfully attempts. No more is required for an object to bear a name than speakers’ 
willingness to coordinate their acts of speaker-reference by relying on the (inexplicit) act of 
naming. The object need not satisfy any other condition than being picked out in that act, for 
such coordination to obtain. They were unprepared to do so in our example, but they could 
easily have been, as they are in many others. Given our (admittedly sketchy) metasemantic 
considerations, this justifies positing successful inexplicit acts at such indeterminate time in 
the ‘Madagascar’ case, so that analytic statements intending the island might count as correct. 
Speakers who say ‘this film is Madagascar’ or ‘this island is Madagascar’ in the adequate 
circumstances should hence be taken as correctly assuming acts of naming (inexplicit and 
inadvertent in the latter case) by which two different specific names in the same generic 
template have been introduced.  
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Now, ‘Madagascar’-like changes can occur also with general terms. In a discussion of 
these issues, Quine mentions one: ‘David Lewis pointed out a nice example to me that brings 
this out. There was, in the nineteenth century, a French naturalist named Pierre Sonnerat, who 
was doing field work in Madagascar. A lemur went up a tree, and Sonnerat asked a native 
‘Qu’est que c’est?’ The native said ‘in dri’, which in Malagasy means ‘There he goes’. 
Sonnerat thought that the native understood his question and had given the answer, and the 
animal is known as the indri to this day’ (Davidson et al., 1974, 500). We can imagine that 
the case was one in which ‘indri’ also referred in Malagasy to a (different) kind – the tree, 
say. In this case, the change prevents the correct, semantic application of ‘indri’ in uses 
deferential on Sonnerat’s inadvertent dubbing to all items in its previous extension, not just 
its use for the particular tree we are imagining the native to refer to with it. But this is not the 
case with proper names: the change in referent affecting uses dependent on Marco Polo’s (or 
the cartographers’) mistake leave unaffected other uses of the same generic name. Present day 
Mogadishu is a good case in point, for (if the Wikipedia story is correct, and ‘Mogadishu’ 
does come from the same expression as ‘Madagascar’) Mogadishu is called Madagascar in 
the same sense that Plato’s teacher was called Socrates.47 
To sum up, in this section I have developed an account of appellative practices involving 
proper names on which successful instances of one and the same have the following features. 
First, tokens of N in the acts instantiating the practice are instances of the same type – one 
and the same word. Second, appellative practices may remain non-instantiated in some 
cases;48 but if there exist concrete ordinary acts implementing a practice, they belong in a 
common causal history: an act of naming, causally independent of every other act in the 
practice, constitutes its origin; others are causally dependent on it, in virtue of speakers’ 
intentions to use the term in accordance with its already established use. Third, originating 
acts of naming have a constitutive semantic purpose. Their primary purpose is to contribute 
to ‘fixing’ (to put it in Kripke’s terms) the semantic value, truth-conditional import of a given 
class of expressions in ordinary speech acts. The goal of the dubbing is to allow speakers to 
successfully coordinate their roles in the performance of the ordinary speech acts constituting 
the naming practice it is intended to establish, by relying only on the link between name and 




5. Metalinguistic descriptivism: the presuppositional account  
 
I will now articulate the pressupositions and related senses the Mill-Frege view ascribes to 
names. In the rest of the section I will show how it deals with usual objections to 
(metalinguistic) descriptivism. On the view, names in RU are like common nouns and other 
constant expressions; they are not indexicals. To schematically distinguish specific names as 
they occur in RU, and generic names as they occur in PU, let me place henceforth a schematic 
index on the former.49 We can now state a conventional schematic character rule for proper 
names, analogous to the ones presented above for indexicals: 
Ni: For any use n of proper name Ni, n refers to x iff x is the unique individual picked out 
in the act of naming instituting the Ni-appellative practice to which n belongs 
Each instance of Ni is a rule associated with a specific proper name: a word individuated by 
its linguistic features, in particular the semantic one constituted by the act of naming fixing its 
reference.50 Thus, Ni is not a rule giving the linguistic meaning of an indexical type. 
Tokens can be typed in many different ways; in addition to specific names (constant 
expressions whose signification is fixed by a specific appellative practice), we can identify 
generic names, identified merely by phonological or physical features. On the present view 
these are not the words occurring in RU. As in the case of indexicals, when a concrete token 
n of a specific name Ni is provided, the rule assigns it a purely linguistic sense involving the 
token, the type it instantiates and the general features mentioned in the linguistic rule. Such a 
linguistic sense would exemplify this schema: whatever individual is picked out in the act of 
naming instituting the Ni-appellative practice to which n belongs. These senses are 
ingredients of presuppositions, of the following form: x is the unique individual picked out in 
the act of naming instituting the Ni-appellative practice to which n belongs. 
The ‘hey, wait a minute’ objection to implicit introductions of names provided a reason in 
favor of the presuppositional view of the metalinguistic being called description associated 
with names. Maier (2015, 323-4) lists another three. The first (the ‘projection’ behavior of the 
description) requires going into issues I cannot discuss here, concerning the contributions of 
names to attitude ascriptions. A full argument for the view I am defending would have to 
address related matters, in particular how it deals with Frege puzzles and empty names; issues 
about the projection behavior of the metalinguistic condition would be very relevant. Like 
Hawthorne & Manley (2012, 236-8) and Rami (2014b, 131-3), I ascribe a limited significance 
to Maier’s third argument, involving alleged cases of binding involving names like the much-
discussed ‘Bambi’ example in Geurts (1997, 321):  
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(10) If a child is christened Bambi and Disney Inc. find out about it, they will sue Bambi’s 
parents. 
Maier’s second argument does provide additional support for the presuppositional account. 
There is a “givenness” or “accessibility” constraint on the use of names. As Maier (2009, 
261) puts it – referring to Sommers (1982) – ‘just like third-person pronouns, names tend to 
pick up their referent from the common ground, established by previous discourse or 
otherwise. It is hard to imagine that I go up to a stranger talking about ‘Horace’ or ‘she’ 
without prior introduction or pointing’. This condition is naturally met in the following way:51 
(11) There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernest is engaged to 
two women. 
The first sentence makes it common ground the condition required for the presupposition – of 
“acquaintance” or “familiarity”, as I (García-Carpintero 2000a) have called them – triggered 
by the name used in the second to be satisfied.52 Now, the speaker doesn’t typically provide 
information enough to independently individuate the relevant naming-practice, nor makes 
thereby any such information common ground. Rather, there is a particular practice that the 
speaker ‘has in mind’, one that he intends; and the audience is intended to defer to it.53 
Kripke (1979, 248, and 1980, 88n) points out that his ‘outline’ of an account of reference-
fixing for names can be turned into a Fregean account of sorts, by taking the communicative 
chain to be the sense of a name-token. I already acknowledged that he there anticipates the 
present account, which follows in the steps of Lewis (1983) and others. In a simple form (cp. 
Devitt 1989) such a maneuver would indeed trivialize a purportedly Fregean account. On 
non-trivial Fregean views, competent speakers know the senses of expressions; senses are 
their cognitive fixes on referents, which is why they may account for differences in the 
cognitive significance of expressions with the same reference.  
The present proposal assumes a tacit knowledge of appellative practices; they are to be 
mentioned in Fine’s (2007, 50) semantic requirements for the language. The schematic rule 
Ni makes explicit something that is to this extent ‘in the head’ of fully competent speakers; 
something tacitly known about the signification of proper names. Applied to a name 
embedded in an appellative practice, this general knowledge provides the purely linguistic 
ingredient of an individuating sense, which fixes the referent. There is thus a general sort of 
knowledge that competent speakers possess: proper names refer to whoever or whatever is 
picked out by the appellative practice on which utterances of them rely.  
I offer three reasons in support of this claim. Firstly, I have given indications of speakers’ 
awareness of the metalinguistic descriptions I have appealed to, manifested in proposals to 
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accommodate such as the one implicit in (9) and their rejection, and in intuitions of validity 
about (5)-(8); predicative uses, on the account given in §7, further manifest such awareness. 
Secondly, the seal parable suggests a sensible rationale for the specific linguistic conventions 
(purely nominal appellative practices) that distinguish this approach from the Millian one. In 
Lewis’s (1969) well-known account, conventions are regularities in the rational behavior of 
members of a community, which are “self-preserved” because they are mutually known to 
exist and to facilitate the attainment of some of the community’s goals. I have pointed out the 
goal that is served by naming conventions: to wit, bringing non-present, non-describable 
individuals into the discourse, and I have explained how they are an adequate means for it. 
Thirdly, although I cannot go into this here, the proposal can be used to account for intuitions 
about identity statements, negative existentials and indirect discourse.  
These reasons justify adopting the view that many are prepared to take regarding 
something like the senses previously assigned to indexicals with regard to the metalinguistic 
senses based on appellative practices here attributed to proper names. Kaplan and others are 
prepared to count indexical senses as belonging in a properly semantic theory, to the extent 
that this is made compatible with the modal insights constitutive of direct reference. The three 
reasons support the claim that we should extend the same treatment to the senses here 
ascribed to proper names: they do not merely belong in a metasemantical account, but must 
be properly incorporated in our semantic theory. 
Procedures of miscellaneous sorts secure analytic statements in purely nominal appellative 
practices. Some resemble the one in the seal parable above, resting on physical attachments of 
inscriptions of the name to the referent. Many proper names function in this way: names of 
streets and cities, names of hotel rooms, movie theaters, etc. Others are analogous, but more 
complex; they additionally involve, say, drawing maps with inscription of the names (in the 
case of some geographical names), or, in the case of the full names of persons as they are 
used in modern societies, official records where the names are correlated with identificatory 
information: place and time of birth, parents, etc.54 To fully understand a given proper name, 
it is of course not necessary to know the specific procedure that secures the ordinary acts 
implementing the practice on which the token relies, only that some or other does. 
Some appellative practices rely on recognitional capacities; those involve the possession of 
a perceptual procedure on the part of some users to identify spatiotemporal stages of the 
referent. Names of people as we use them ordinarily (and no doubt as they were used in less 
complex societies) function in this way. The present proposal extends to them the point just 
made for names whose appellative practices do not depend on recognitional capacities, that is, 
that to fully understand tokens of them it is not necessary to know the specific recognitional 
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procedure securing the practice. People with the relevant recognitional capacities play in 
practice the role of the physical labels in the other cases: their recognitional capacities are 
convenient but linguistically contingent resources required for the practice to be in place.  
The acts of naming constituting practices related to ‘descriptive names’ (like Evans’s 
‘Julius’, and proper names for abstract (‘pi’) or theoretical objects (‘Saggitarius A*’, the 
supermassive black hole at the center of the Milky Way) consist of stipulations of the 
signification of the proper name given by using descriptions of its referent. Although this case 
merits further discussion, the previous view will be tentatively extended here to these names: 
fully understanding a token of one of them requires only a general knowledge of appellative 
practices; it does not require the specific knowledge deployed in the act of naming instituting 
the relevant appellative practice.55 
The linguistic senses of proper names are obtained by instantiating the schematic rule Ni 
above with a particular name. I have suggested that proper names may be fully understood 
without possessing a different mode of presentation of the referent in addition to the purely 
linguistic one: a capacity to recognize the referent, a perceptual way of presenting it, or an 
alternative description. What is required, as illustrated with (11), is to identify (perhaps 
deferentially on the speaker’s intentions) the relevant practice. ‘— I have to go. José María is 
very ill.’ ‘—Which José María do you mean?’ ‘— A dog I care about.’ As Evans said: ‘It is 
true that people share names, but the supplementation of a name by some other piece of 
information which by itself would have been virtually useless, is often adequate’ (Evans 
1982, 380). This is so because we rely on the speaker to supply the individuation of the 
relevant naming-practice.  
This similarity between proper names and indexicals should not make us overlook their 
differences. The ‘existential’ properties of an indexical that determine its referent, relative to 
the semantic rule for the type it instantiates, typically vary with the context of utterance, from 
instance to instance of the same type. Such reliance on roles typically filled in the context of 
any linguistic utterance, but possibly filled differently from utterance to utterance, is a 
defining feature of genuine indexicals. As Evans puts it, tokens of indexicals are ‘one-off’ 
expressions: uses of them are not necessarily part of a practice of using tokens of that type to 
refer to a given object. Proper names, like other expressions that rely on appellative practices, 
are crucially not so ‘one-off’: the same appellative practice may be relied upon in many 
different contexts, securing the same referent for many different instances of a proper name-
type.56 It is essential to the way proper names (and most other non-indexical expressions) 
linguistically function that they are (de jure) anaphoric devices, used to indicate that 
reference is being made to the same entity already referred to in a different context.57  
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Compatibly with its core Fregeanism, the present account thus accepts both the traditional 
Millian intuition that proper names are mere ‘identifying tags’ (Marcus 1961, 11), and the 
neo-Millian claim that proper names are rigid designators. The purely nominal character of 
the appellative practices associated with proper names accounts for the traditional Millian 
point. And the account acknowledges the rigidity of names for the reasons discussed earlier 
for indexicals: the senses here attributed to proper names are merely assumed to 
conventionally guide the fixation of reference in the metalinguistic triggered presuppositions, 
not to individuate the primarily asserted state of affairs.58  
Commoners who identify names in referential uses with metalinguistic descriptions have 
in contrast serious trouble. Rami (2014a, 853-4) and Schoubye (forthcoming, §3.1) provide 
compelling arguments against predicativist proposals to deal with the rigidity data. They 
either have empirical difficulties, or are ad hoc or otherwise lack explanatory value, given the 
predicativist framework assuming the uniformity of names in RU and PU. Thus, Fara (2015) 
appeals to the claim that most names in RU are incomplete descriptions, and incomplete 
descriptions are typically rigid. But not all metalinguistic descriptions associated with names 
are incomplete (‘Kristallnacht’), and not all incomplete descriptions are rigid. Elbourne’s 
(2005) account appeals to singular restrictors. However, if generalized this maneuver would 
eliminate the distinction between names and descriptions: unlike names in RU, the latter have 
non-rigid readings.59 Moreover, this account requires for a name to refer to an object relative 
to a possible world that the object bears the name also in that world, against clear-cut 
intuitions about the possible-worlds truth-conditions of sentences with names in RU.60 
As suggested at the end of §3, a proper reply to the modal argument for Millianism should 
be based on resources that also allow responses to the semantic and epistemic arguments. The 
Mill-Frege view provides them. Firstly, every competent speaker who understands a use of 
‘Aristotle’ associates (tacitly) with it a description – that the referent is an entity called 
Aristotle. Hence, ignorance considerations do not apply to the descriptive material provided 
by the Mill-Frege theory. Nor does the point that when speakers do associate descriptions 
with a name, they may pick out something different from its intuitive referent, as illustrated 
by Kripke’s ‘Schmidt’ case. Even if Schmidt, not Gödel, proved the incompleteness 
theorems, according to the Mill-Frege theory our uses of ‘Gödel’ pick out Gödel and not 
Schmidt as their referent. Secondly, to count as a priori the proposition expressed by 
utterances of n is whatever individual is picked out in the acts of naming constituting the Ni-
appellative practice to which n belongs, if some such exists is not as obviously objectionable 
as corresponding proposals based on the descriptive theories aptly criticized by Kripke.61 
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Searle (1983) argues that the causal theory does not give the ‘essential character of the 
institution of proper names’. Although I have not defended the causal theory, his argument 
would also undermine the present account in terms of appellative practices if successful. I 
will show that it is not. Here is the example: 
[…] imagine a primitive hunter-gatherer community with a language 
containing proper names. […] Imagine that everybody in the tribe knows 
everybody else and that newborn members of the tribe are baptized at 
ceremonies attended by the entire tribe. Imagine, furthermore, that as the 
children grow up they learn the names of people as well as the local names of 
mountains, lakes, streets, houses, etc., by ostension. Suppose also that there is 
a strict taboo in this tribe against speaking of the dead, so that no one’s name 
is ever mentioned after his death. Now the point of the fantasy is simply this: 
As I have described it, this tribe has an institution of proper names used for 
reference in exactly the same way that our names are used for reference, but 
there is not a single use of a name in the tribe that satisfies the causal chain of 
communication theory. […] Every use of the name in this tribe as I described 
it satisfies the descriptivist claim that there is an Intentional content 
associating the name with the object. (Searle 1983, 240) 
Searle assumes that the referent of any use of a proper name is determined by descriptive 
material that the speaker has in mind, independently of any acts of naming belonging to social 
appellative practices.62 However, to the extent that the tribe’s institution of proper names is 
really like ours, I think that Searle is wrong. Imagine that speaker S has been erroneously 
introduced to lake A (which is big) as lake B: S’s teacher mistakenly told him in the presence 
of a big lake – different from the small one called B – that it was called B. Now speaker S 
says ‘B is big’. If Searle’s point were correct, S would be literally saying something true; for 
it would be the representation of the lake to which S was introduced as ‘B’ and he has now in 
mind, which in that case would determine the referent of this use of ‘B’. But clear-cut 
intuitions that I think any good theory should honor indicate that the case is a malapropism: 
the speaker has literally said something false. The utterance is correct about the speaker’s 
referent of that use of ‘B’ (cf. Kripke 1977), but not about its semantic referent.  
I will conclude this section by discussing Kripke’s circularity objection. The Mill-Frege 
view can adopt a well-established line of reply.63 First, although a theory of reference in 
general should not be circular, a theory of how names refer is not such a theory; Kripke’s own 
‘outline’ would fail that requirement, because his account of baptisms assumes the notion of 
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reference by means of indexicals or descriptions. Second, the account is not circular, by 
Kripke’s (1980, 70) characterization: the referent of a use of ‘Socrates’ in an utterance is not 
explained in terms of the act of reference performed by that expression in that utterance, but 
in terms of the property of bearing that name, which in turn depends on how the use relates to 
acts of naming and to the practice in which it belongs. We do not explain the reference of a 
use of Ni as whatever that use refers to. We explain the reference of a use of Ni in a speech 
act in terms of other speech acts, acts of naming, in which the name-type Ni is not used; the 
referential use of other expressions in them is to be independently explained.64  
Now, the discussion of ‘Madagascar’ cases in the preceding section shows that matters are 
more delicate than usually assumed, because acts of naming have themselves a semantic role, 
not merely an institutional one: as we saw, whether the act of naming on which a use of Ni 
relies remains in force depends on the referential role that Ni might play there and elsewhere. 
But explaining this role does not involve the concept of reference of any particular use of a 
proper name either. In terms of Fine’s (1995) useful distinction, the reference of a particular 
use of Ni specifically depends on an act of naming; the fact that the act of naming sustains that 
semantic reference generically depends on its availability, and of others like it. These are 
reverse dependences of different kinds, and hence their reversal consistent. 
To be sure, the present account does not help reduce intentional notions to non-intentional 
ones. Similarly, my explications of the senses of indexicals in fact use indexicals (the bold-
face letters referring to uses), which makes it clear that they cannot help to promote a 
reductive account of indexical reference. This shouldn’t worry us. The Mill-Frege theory 
assumes that intentional notions involved in language use can be illuminatingly explicated 
with the intentional notions of folk-psychological explanations. This undertaking is not aimed 
at producing conceptual or a posteriori reductions of intentional properties to non-intentional 
ones, or of social intentional notions to psychological ones. The real objection would be that 
we have not explicated the nature of reference by means of proper names, not that we have 
not explained it by refraining from using intentional notions.65 
 
 
6. Problems for commonerism 
 
In this section I will raise several objections to different forms of commonerism, in its 
referentialist and predicativist incarnations, and I will also reply to some objections raised 
against properist views like the Mill-Frege account by commoners. 
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 6.1 Specific names are sui generis words  
As I have been emphasizing, words are identified not just syntactically and phonologically, 
but also semantically.66 Commoners will take them, also when they occur in RU, to have a 
semantics that allows them to potentially apply to different individuals: indexicalists 
assimilate them to expressions like ‘she’, having a character that yields at a context the 
individual at the context bearing the name (Schoubye forthcoming, 16); predicativists take 
them to signify a property, applying to all individuals bearing the name (Bach 2002, 75). 
Now, Schoubye (ibid., 15) is right to point out a relevant intuitive difference between 
context-sensitivity and homonymy: 
[A] reason to think that there is a difference between the context-sensitivity of 
pronouns and lexical ambiguity is this: it would be entirely unsurprising and 
unremarkable if some speaker S was competent with only one meaning of a 
lexically ambiguous word. For example, S might know that ‘bat’ is used to 
talk about a piece of sporting equipment, but not know that it is also used to 
talk about nocturnal animals. In contrast, it would be surprising and quite 
remarkable if, say, the word ‘she’ was part of S’s vocabulary (i.e. suppose S 
used the word to refer to his mother), yet S was unaware that it can be used to 
refer to different individuals. Indeed, one might think that S, in this case, is 
just not competent with the meaning of ‘she’. In contrast, in the previous case, 
it does seem that S is competent with one of the meanings of ‘bat’. 
Similarly, a speaker who thinks that ‘cat’ applies to just one object, but not to others of the 
same kind would reveal lexical incompetence. Different lexical rules are posited for ‘you’ and 
‘I’, ‘bat’ (at least two) and ‘cat’ precisely on account of facts like these. However, Schoubye 
never considers whether this is also true of names as they occur in RU; he just implicitly 
takes it for granted. But it seems clear to me that this is wrong. 
Firstly, as Schoubye points out, someone who competently understands ‘you’ or ‘cat’ 
knows that these terms potentially apply to more than one individual. In contrast, someone 
who competently understands a referential use of a proper name might still fail to understand 
other uses of the same generic type, if she lacks the contextual information also necessary to 
understand them. In her discussion of predicativism, Jeshion (2015, 391) interestingly brings 
up names that we take to apply to a single entity, such as ‘Kristallnacht’ and ‘Watergate’. 
Were I talking to someone who assumes that ‘Kristallnacht’ applies to an event in the 19th 
century, I would say, Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that there was any other 
Kristallnacht than the SA attacks in 1938. I would not thereby be betraying any lack of 
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competence, as I would be by objecting to an ordinary referential use of ‘you’ Hey, wait a 
minute, I did not know that there was any other you than the person I was recently talking 
to.67 Similarly, someone who assumed that names, like social security numbers, have only 
one bearer would not thereby be incompetent in their use. For commoners, these differences 
should just be answerable to contingent beliefs about how widespread is the extension of the 
predicative conditions with which the expressions are associated: being addressed, being 
male, being called John, being called Kristallnacht.68 That seems wrong. 
Secondly, it is true that someone who understands any proper name applied to a particular 
entity, including ‘Kristallnacht’, is in a position to understand the expression when applied to 
a different one. This may happen by joining a conversation in which it is used, understanding 
that it is a proper name and understanding it deferentially, to refer to whatever the participants 
are taking it to refer to. As explained in the previous section, from the present viewpoint this 
would involve accommodating the presupposition that there is a supporting naming practice, 
deferring to speakers’ singular intentions. But someone who understands a proper name is in 
this way in a position to understand any other one equally well.69 In this respect the types 
‘John’ and ‘Albert’ do not differ, the way the types ‘I’ and ‘you’ do. There is a semantic rule 
associated with each of the latter, so that one might be competent in the use of one but not in 
the use of the other. Someone who is learning English may understand ‘I’ but not yet ‘you’. 
As a result, she will not understand concrete tokens of ‘you’; not for the reasons that someone 
who knows the conventional rule might yet fail to understand a specific token (viz., for lack 
of specifically contextual information that is additionally required), but for the more basic 
reason that she does not know the rule related with the type. The rules are also independent, 
in that a language could exist with one expression and not the other. Neither of this applies to 
‘John’ and ‘Albert’. Thus, this point doesn’t justify ascribing them two different characters. 
 
6.2 There are not just specific, but also generic names  
Arguments that commoners typically level against properism have an easy reply; besides, 
on the basis of this reply, as I will show the tables are easily turned against them. Bach (2002, 
89) summarizes approvingly those arguments, as given by Katz (2001, 148-154):70 the 
properists’ “way of individuating names entails that ‘namesake’ is an empty term, that it is 
redundant for a son named after his father to put ‘Jr.’ after his name, and that if Brenda Starr 
married Kenneth Starr, she would change her last name by taking his”. These apparent 
incongruities that Katz derives from the properist view as a reduction manifest the same 
intuitions behind predicative uses such as (2)-(4), and they call for the same explanation: the 
properist perspective acknowledges not only the specific names that on the view are the true 
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words in RU, but also generic ‘names’. The intuitions that Katz relies on merely show that 
generic ‘names’ are also intuitively accessible: namesakes share generic names; sometimes 
sons put ‘Jr.’ after their generic name when they share it with their fathers, for obvious 
reasons;71 women in some cultures substitute their husbands’ last generic name for theirs – 
and hence Brenda Starr will not change her ‘name’ if she marries Kenneth Starr. 
Now, I have been enclosing ‘name’ inside scare quotes in the above explanations because 
from the properist perspective generic names are not strictly speaking (proper) names (Kaplan 
1990, 111); they only count as words in virtue of predicative uses, in which they are not 
proper names but common nouns. How we, as ordinary speakers, count them is of no 
consequence, because what words are is a highly theoretical matter, not to be decided just on 
the basis of intuitions of ordinary speakers.72 In order to deal with the legitimate aspects of 
Katz’s arguments, it is only required that positing generic names is not an ad hoc maneuver. 
But it is not, against what Rami (2014b, 123-5) contends. Let us see why.  
The accounts we are considering are all metalinguistic, as we have seen, in that the 
condition they ultimately provide for the application of names mentions expressions. Now, as 
I have emphasized in my work on quotation, we have the practice of using that device to refer 
not just to the lexical items tokens of which they include (types in my view, as I said, abstract 
entities with instances), but also to other entities they relate to. Thus, for instance, in ‘“gone” 
is cursive’ the quotation refers to a type constituted by italic inscriptions of the word ‘gone’ 
(García-Carpintero forthcoming-b). As this illustrates, we refer by means of quotations to 
types that are not words.73 Unlike words, which (even if response-dependent) I take to be 
sufficiently natural kinds (Wetzel 2009, 106), such types are highly unnatural. It might be 
said that only a ‘linguistically relevant type’ can be the semantic referent of a quotation, while 
all others are mere speakers’ referents (Gómez-Torrente 2011), but this hardly affects the 
point. We understand quotations that do not refer to lexical items as easily as we interpret 
predicative uses of proper names. In fact, these issues appear to be interrelated.74 This allows 
for a second objection to commonerism. 
The point just made shows that there are many more generic names than we might initially 
have thought: in parallel to referents of quotations, generic names might be individuated in 
assorted ways, as our intuitions manifest. Consider the following variation on an example by 
Gray (2015). A group of Barcelona teachers often discuss name trends among their pupils. 
They have noted that ‘Julia’ has become fashionable, but that there are different tendencies 
regarding its pronunciation: some choose the Spanish /'χu lja/, some the Catalan /'dʒu:lɪə/. 
The first day of school, one of them reports: this year I have two (girls named) /'xu lja(s)/ and 
three (named) /'dʒu:lɪə(s)/.75 The utterance includes predicates expressing a property defined 
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in terms of a type that for neither properists nor commoners is a lexical item. Whether the 
intended meaning has been conveyed pragmatically, as perhaps a particularized implicature 
derived from its semantic referent, is immaterial: even so, the example shows that, in the sort 
of context that commoners call our attention to, we refer to non-words. (And we intuitively 
find correct to call them ‘names’.) As Gray (2015, 121) points out, this shows that the appeal 
to simplicity can be turned against predicativism; for these examples can be accounted for by 
means of the very tools that referentialists use to deal with predicative uses. 
Rami (2014b, 125) asks how generic and specific names are related. Words have semantic, 
syntactical and phonological features. They are pronounced and, in written languages, spelled 
in particular ways. As Wetzel (2009, 60-68) points out, they have different pronunciations 
and spellings in different groups of language speakers, located at different times or place. 
Given that words can be mispronounced/misspelled (Kaplan 1990, 105), just as musical 
works can be misperformed, pronunciations and spellings might be thought of, like musical 
works (Wolterstorff 1980), as conditions on correct articulations. Generic names would thus 
be types such that, by instantiating them, names would be correctly pronounced or spelled.76 
Thus understood, they can certainly be shared by people otherwise bearing different names.  
Rami (ibid.) also questions properists’ accounts of the name-bearing relation. Let me take 
up this additional challenge. In a perfectly good sense of ‘being called’, to be called a given 
term is to have that term applied to one – to be referred to by means of it. In that sense, 
clearly one can be called Albert (or, rather, ‘Albert’, as Fara (2011, 493) suggests), without 
bearing the name ‘Albert’ and without being an Albert. This is why we should put aside this 
sense for our purposes (Bach 2002, 83; Fara 2015a, 74; Rami (2014a, 856-8); cp. Burge 
(1973, 428-30) on ‘appropriately being given a name’).77 In the relevant sense, to be called 
Albert is to have ‘Albert’ as a name of yours, to be a bearer of the name ‘Albert’ (Fara 2015, 
73-4). Now, properists should take the quotations in these phrases, in their most fundamental 
sense, to refer to a specific name. As we have seen, there is a serious indeterminacy issue 
concerning the generic name that a quotation like ‘Albert’ refers to; but let us assume that 
there is a sufficiently stable precisification – say, Gómez-Torrente’ (2011, 149) ‘linguistically 
relevant type’. Then, from the properist perspective we can say that, in an extended sense, one 
bearsG (is being calledG or namedG by) a generic name just in case there is a specific name 
instantiating it that one bearsS (is calledS or namedS) in the fundamental sense. 
 
6.3 Which characters do generic-names-taken-as-indexicals have?  
I have raised doubts in §6.1 about indexicalist commoner referentialism, questioning the 
notion that generic names are words with a distinctive semantics in RU; i.e., that they have a 
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character, or there are rules of use for them. Now I want to raise some additional serious 
difficulties, and critically examine a recent sophisticated form of it: Rami’s (2014b). 
Characters are functions that provide the semantic value of an expression relative to some 
contextual feature. Which feature, in the case of generic names understood as indexicals? An 
obvious possibility is Recanati’s (1993, 141, 166): a naming-practice or naming-convention.78 
However, as Rami (2014b, 137) points out, this proposal presupposes the non-indexical, 
properist form of referentialism; because it assumes that there are linguistic conventions that 
endow specific names with a referent.79 Hence, on this elaboration the indexical proposal is a 
cog turning idly. It assumes that there are specific names – lexical items working according to 
the properist account. It then uses this to ascribe a character to an additional lexical item, the 
generic name. This is unnecessary; it is more economical to consider the relevant contextual 
factors as presemantic disambiguation mechanisms. We might as well claim that generic 
‘bank’ is an “indexical”, a further lexical item with a character that in some contexts selects 
financial institutions as extensions and in others geographical features. 
Now, Recanati is aware of this problem, and confronts it by declaring that the conventions 
assigning reference to specific names are not ‘linguistic’ (1993, 138), in that ‘it does not seem 
necessary to know the bearers of all proper names to be linguistically competent, as far as 
natural languages are concerned’. However, as he admits (1993, 144-6), in the ordinary sense 
of being competent concerning which we have relevant intuitions, this does not distinguish 
names from other expressions, in particular common nouns: except perhaps in that, in the 
case of proper names, there are many more expressions about which competent speakers have 
no more than the deferential understanding we have already pointed out we might have of all 
proper names. But this is just an accidental result of the fact that, while a language is a 
general tool to be used in many different circumstances, proper names are intended to serve 
communicative needs concerning concrete entities circumscribed to a more or less limited 
spatiotemporal range. This is, as far as I can see, what the localness that Recanati (1993, 146-
9) takes to be distinctive of names comes to. As he candidly admits, this is just a matter of 
degree: many common nouns are also highly ‘local’, used to communicate information about 
tools, plants or food to which very few speakers have access. This is obviously no reason for 
denying them the character of linguistic expressions.80 We should remind ourselves of the 
plain fact that names occur in well-formed sentences, with a distinctive syntactic and 
semantic profile. How can they fail to be linguistic expressions?81 
Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998, 294-5) appeal to a (salient, or prominent) contextual ‘dubbing 
in force’, which they characterize in these terms: ‘A dubbing is a speech-act whereby a name 
acquires a referent, and a dubbing is in force in a given context if in that context the item that 
31 
was dubbed in that dubbing bears the name it received in that dubbing’. The condition that 
the dubbing is ‘in force’ is there for ‘Madagascar’-like cases; the initial baptism for a portion 
of the continent is supposed not to be ‘in force’, because that portion of the continent no 
longer bears the name.82 This is subject to the objection against Recanati’s account, namely, 
that it presupposes the non-indexical, properist form of referentialism if bearing a name is to 
be ultimately explained relative to that account. That aside, the obvious concern is that too 
many dubbings involving most (generic) names are ‘in force’ when we use tokens of them. 
Pelczar & Rainsbury (ibid., 295) appeal to a dubbing in force being raised to prominence.83  
Now, as Rami (2014b, 138-9) and Sainsbury (2015, 197-8) wonder, how does a given 
dubbing or act of naming become salient in a context? As said above, items such as ‘(1)’ in 
this article are fleeting proper names we use to refer to sentences. Their initial dubbings can 
be said to be salient in the context of the article in which they occur. But what about the 
dubbing introducing the ‘Saul Kripke’-practice that I have also been invoking in this paper? I 
do not directly know anything about it, and I do not expect my readers to; so how can it be 
salient in the present context? We do have indirect access to it, as the dubbing that created the 
practice that I am relying on; but appealing to this fact is subject to the difficulty raised for 
the previous proposal, namely, that it presupposes the properist view. Pelczar & Rainsbury 
also confuse facts about how we find out who is referred to by a name, with facts about its 
determination. It may well be that in a context a dubbing is most salient, but nonetheless the 
true referent of the name is not the one picked out by it.84 
Rami (2014b) articulates a sophisticated version of indexicalist commonerism. He assumes 
Predelli’s (2013) framework, on which, in addition to their meaning, expressions come 
associated with ‘conditions of use’ determining proper or correct uses. This is similar to the 
present framework; in fact, Rami allows for these conditions to have a presuppositional 
status. As in other indexicalist accounts, such conditions of use are on Rami’s view associated 
with generic names, and they rely on speakers’ intentions. But, firstly, his (2014b, 148-9) 
account invokes the name-bearing relation: the referent of N must be a bearer of (generic) N. 
As we are seeing, that relation appears to presuppose the properist account. Secondly, as I’ll 
explain now it is unclear that the full view is extensionally adequate.  
Rami contends that the referents of correct uses of names are determined in a plurality of 
ways. In some cases, it is just deference on previous users; but in many cases, the referent 
must, in addition to fulfilling the name-bearing condition, fit an act of demonstration, or a 
conveyed descriptive condition. This is reminiscent of Searle’s (1983) and McKinsey’s 
(1984, 2011) views critically discussed in §5 above. Consider this variation on an example 
Rami (2014b, 127) gives. It has been announced that Bob Dylan is giving a performance 
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tonight. As someone comes on stage, the host utters: ‘We are proud to present Bob Dylan’. 
Imagine, however, that the person on stage is not Bob Dylan, the composer of Blowing in the 
Wind, but an impostor who nonetheless bears the (generic) name ‘Bob Dylan’. This creates a 
dilemma. On the first horn, Rami’s account entails that the proper referent of this use of ‘Bob 
Dylan’ is the person on stage, because it fits the generic name-bearing condition, and is the 
object made salient by a demonstration. As in the case of Searle’s and McKinsey’s views, this 
seems to me a confusion of speaker and semantic reference. Similar counterexamples can be 
produced for Rami’s cases of descriptive identification of the name bearer.85 On the second 
horn, it is not the generic name-bearing condition that must be satisfied, but a more restricted 
one, individuated by the specific act of naming involving Bob Dylan, the singer.86 In that case 
the account is subject to the objection already raised for Recanati’s.87 
The same issues recur for predicativist commoners who, like Bach (2002, 92-3) and Fara 
(2015a, 106-8), take names in referential positions to be incomplete descriptions, like ‘the 
table’ or ‘the book’. They do not say how the relevant contextual restriction comes about; as 
far as we can tell, the options are those just discussed: (i) an act of naming is made either 
directly salient, or indirectly through a specific naming practice of which the token used in 
the context is part. But the first option is not generally available, and the second presupposes 
the referentialist account. (ii) The referent is made salient by demonstration or description, 
and semantic reference to it is constrained by its being a bearer of the generic name, as in 
Rami’s proposal. But this generates a potential confusion of semantic and speaker reference. 
 
6.4 Circularity issues  
As argued at the end of §5, the Mill-Frege referentialist metalinguistic descriptivism does 
not succumb to Kripke’s circularity objection. What about predicativist versions? They 
confront the same issues (Gray 2014, 213-6); and it is unclear that they have the resources to 
deal with them on their own terms. Predicativists elucidate the property that they take names 
to express by appealing to the name-bearing relation. They tend to argue that this relation is 
extra-linguistic, so there should be no circularity issue (Geurts 1997, 326-7; Bach 2002, 83; 
Rami 2014a, 858). But these writers do not provide an account of naming practices and the 
acts of naming instituting them that justifies this claim. We have given reasons in §4.1 to 
conclude that naming practices – involving acts of reference performed with names in RU – 
and the acts of naming instituting them are dependent on each other. On the one hand, in RU 
uses of (specific) names semantically refer to the individual, if any, picked out in the act of 
naming instituting the practice to which the use belongs. On the other hand, acts of naming 
are purposeful activities, tools intended to allow for the successful performance of acts of 
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reference based on the just stated condition; it is because of this that in Madagascar-like cases 
an act of naming ceases to be in force in the relevant contexts – and is replaced by one 
constituting another name, on the view articulated above. 
Can predicativists deal with the potential circularity that this creates in the way I have 
done, using their own resources? Gray (2014) aims for this. For predicativist, the relevant 
word is the generic name, applying to all its bearers. In bare RU, the predicate occurs together 
with a covert definite determiner. Now, Gray notes that when speakers use descriptive noun 
phrases such as ‘the table’, they ‘typically presuppose that some satisfier of the predicate is 
uniquely identifiable by the participants in the discourse’ (ibid., 216). Inspired by this, he 
suggests to ‘understand name-bearing in terms of what is typically presupposed about the 
extensions of nominal predicates’ (ibid., 217). So he submits that an individual x satisfies 
(generic) ‘Alfred’ (i.e., is a bearerG of ‘Alfred’) iff there is a group of speakers such that in 
relevant contexts they presuppose that x satisfies (i.e., bearsG) ‘Alfred’ (ibid., 218, 227).  
Now, this obviously doesn’t work in general. At a certain point, users of ‘fish’ and ‘the 
fish’ presupposed that it applied to whales, but it did not; and, as in Donnellan’s (1966) 
famous example, users might have good reasons to presuppose that ‘king’ and ‘the king’ 
apply to x, without x being more than an usurper, and without their believing otherwise. But 
Gray thinks that names are exceptional. He takes an act of naming x Alfred to be ‘a public 
avowal to act as if x satisfies “Alfred”’ (ibid., 224), and dismisses circularity worries with 
considerations like those I made in §4.2 above, owning only a ‘practical circularity’: 
why do such avowals, under the right circumstances, bring it about that other 
speakers will presuppose the same thing? … if I say I’m going to act as if x 
satisfies ‘Alfred’, given your interest in grasping my referential intentions, you 
should take utterances of mine involving ‘Alfred’, under the right 
circumstances, as reflecting my intention to speak about x, and you should, 
given your interest in having me grasp your referential intentions, use ‘Alfred’ 
if you wish me to conclude that you intend to say something about x. Given 
their interest in achieving referential communication, each speaker has a 
reason to act as if x satisfies ‘Alfred’ just in case every other speaker is likely 
to act the same way. An avowal, under the right circumstances, to act in that 
way by a single speaker can give a group of speakers decisive reason to act in 
the same way …  there is a kind of circularity here, but it is a form of practical 
circularity that is characteristic of cooperative conventional behavior. A given 
speaker is willing to act as if x satisfies ‘Alfred’ because he knows that other 
speakers are typically willing to act in the same way – and this willingness is 
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not based on some antecedent match between the descriptive condition 
associated with the predicate and speakers’ conception of the properties of the 
individual. Nominal predicates are, as it were, empty vessels, waiting to be 
filled with the coordinated intentions of a group of speakers (ibid., 224-5) 
This is well taken. But when we look into the details, they conflict with predicativism. The 
crucial feature of the account in §4 above relevant here is the ‘purely nominal’ character 
ascribed there to acts of naming, which elaborates, I take it, on the point Gray makes with the 
‘empty vessels’ metaphor. This explicitly concerns the referential role of names. As argued 
above, on any sensible metasemantics the systematic disparity between the speaker-referent 
of a series of uses of a given name, and the referent assigned at the dubbing that prima facie 
historically grounds it, results given the ‘purely nominal’ character of these practices in that 
the effect of that dubbing is nullified – and also in that a new, inexplicit and inadvertent 
dubbing goes into effect by a peculiar sort of accommodation.  
Now, as indicated above, there are similar cases involving general terms, such as the one I 
imagined for ‘indri’. But there is a crucial difference, which is explained by the fact that these 
practices are not ‘purely nominal’. The annulment of the effect of the dubbing to which the 
uses systematically at variance historically lead doesn't affect other uses of the same generic 
name, including present-day uses of ‘Mogadishu’ with the same origin. If ‘indri’ had been 
introduced in the original use we imagined for a kind of tree, by pointing to an exemplar, 
once the word comes to be used for lemurs it doesn’t just fail to apply to that particular tree, 
but to any other of the kind also. This fails to happen with ‘Madagascar’. It shows that uses of 
a given generic name can be grouped together into different sub-types, relative to different 
baptisms, identified by their potential nullification if a Madagascar-like systematic disparity 
comes about. But this is just a multiple-homonyms, properist view. 
In sum, then, a referential use of a generic name N refers to an object o only if the object 
bears the name; hence (using Pelczar’s & Rainsbury’s notion) only if a particular dubbing 
involving N is ‘in force’; hence, only if it is permissible to use the specific name created with 
that dubbing to perform ordinary speech acts about o with it, in particular correct analytic 
statements. It is specific names that are thus deployed in referential uses of proper names. 
 
 
7. Predicative uses as metalinguistic meaning-transfers 
 
I will conclude by presenting the account I favor for predicative uses. Nunberg’s (1995) 
proposal, which Leckie (2013) and Jeshion (2015) apply to the present issue, has it that a 
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target new predicative interpretation for a given term is derived from a source meaning the 
term has on the basis of a manifest relation between the entities to which the term applies in 
its source meaning and those to which it is intended to apply in the target interpretation. Thus, 
in ‘the ham sandwich left without paying’, the relation is target ordered source; in ‘three 
Picassos hang at the exhibition’, source produced target.88 In some cases the process by 
which uses of expressions acquire these new interpretations is purely pragmatic; in others 
they should be understood as codified in the lexicon, hence inducing polysemy – perhaps as a 
result of standardization – and to that extent ‘semantic’.89 
Now, both Leckie (2013, 1152-3) and Jeshion (2015, 379-81) argue that it would not do to 
take the source meaning for predicative uses of proper names to be their referential uses (as it 
clearly is in ‘three Picassos hang at the exhibition’).90 A reason in addition to those they 
mention is that there are many predicative uses in which it is either implausible or utterly out 
of the question to think that the speakers might be using the names in their referential uses 
(cf. Gray ms, §3.2 on ‘source-arbitrariness’). The following variations on much-discussed 
examples in the literature illustrate it this: 
(12) I bet Aaron Aardvarks, if there are any, always come first in directories.91 
(13) If I ever met a Gerontius, I would suggest that he change his name.92 
Leckie and Jeshion suggest that names in sources for predicative uses are mentioned, not 
used: the true sources for such uses are not their ordinary referents, but the ‘expressions’ that 
the quotations they in fact are in those cases refer to.93 The relation which on their view 
underwrites the metonymical transfer in predicative uses is: target bears/has been given the 
(name) source. This is close to the view I favor. Before presenting it, I’ll discuss some 
objections by Rami (2015, 414) to such accounts, and his alternative proposal. 
A first objection Rami makes is that ‘it might be doubted that competent speakers really 
are confused about the correct interpretation of [(2)-(4)], and that the correct use of “Alfred” 
in such a context requires the use of quotation marks’. But as far as I can see the present 
proposal doesn’t need to ascribe any unwarranted confusion to competent speakers. First, it is 
common to quote without quotation marks; in spoken language there is no standard way to 
indicate them. The so-called ‘use theory’ of quotation, arguably first defended by Frege, 
relies on that fact in support of its distinctive claim that quotation marks do not play any 
semantic role: all expressions are systematically ambiguous between their ordinary meanings 
and a quotational use. Leckie (2013, 1153) in fact considers that view appealing. I myself 
have argued against it (SUPPRESSED), in favor of a version of a Davidsonian demonstrative 
view on which quotation marks are indeed required in fully literal, explicit quotational uses. 
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But even on such a view, as far as I can tell, the point that we standardly quote without using 
quotation marks suffices to answer Rami’s qualm. Moreover, there are other cases such as 
metalinguistic negation, metalinguistic uses of gradable adjectives to fix the standard in a 
particular context and so-called ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ (cf. SUPPRESSED for discussion 
and further references), which some theorists treat as involving quotation. If I understand well 
Rami’s objection, he should extend the complaint to such proposals, which I think would be 
methodologically unsupported. Which uses are quotational appears to be a theoretical issue, 
not always transparent to competent speakers just on the basis of their linguistic competence. 
In order to show that their proposal is not ad hoc, Leckie and Jeshion provide examples of 
predicative uses of words other than names, based on manifest quotational uses of such 
words, like ‘four “awesome”s is more than enough in a blog-post’ (Jeshion 2015, 381).94 A 
second objection by Rami that I want to discuss (for it will help me to introduce my own 
account of the predicativist data, based on the Mill-Frege view) is a response to this point. In 
a nutshell, he argues that such cases are much more flexible and context-sensitive than 
standard predicative uses of proper names. He (2015, 414) considers the following example: 
(14) There are two ‘Alfred’(s) in this room. 
In his objection he (ibid.) says: 
There might be a situation where we find two inscriptions of the word ‘Alfred’ 
on a blackboard in a certain room and where two bearers of the name ‘Alfred’ 
are also present. If the given interpretation of [(2)-(4)] is correct, then one 
might use the sentence [(14)] relative to such a situation with two different 
readings: One can either convey that there are two inscriptions of the name 
‘Alfred’ in the mentioned room or that there are two bearers of the name 
‘Alfred’ in this room. In general, a sentence like [(14)] can have a number of 
different readings that depend on the specific contextually salient transfer 
relation. Hence, these are examples of occurrent [i.e., pragmatic] meaning 
transfer. But intuitively the mentioned original uses of proper nouns do not 
have this kind of flexibility and contextual variability.95 
The ‘Frege’ metalinguistic descriptivist side of the Mill-Frege account helps with the 
response to Rami here. I will elaborate on this indirectly, by critically examining first the 
explanation Rami (2015, 425) goes on to provide after formulating these objections, based on 
his own account of names (Rami 2014b). As indicated above, his account has some parallels 
with the Mill-Frege view; in particular, it is a form of metalinguistic descriptivism that has 
the metalinguistic descriptive condition figuring not in truth-conditional content, but as a 
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‘condition on use’.96 However, there is a crucial difference: Rami’s view is a sophisticated 
form of indexicalism, i.e., of commoner referentialism, discussed in §6.3. Against properism, 
he takes generic ‘Albert’ to be the true word in RU, having a ‘character’ like ‘she’ or ‘he’. 
His account of the sort of meaning-transfer at stake in predicative uses relies on this view. He 
mentions examples like (15) in support of it:97 
(15) Jules is a she/her, not a he/him. 
Here the manifest relation is (to put it in my own terms) something like target is what source 
is presupposed to be. This is the relation that he takes to explains predicative uses of names. 
Properist referentialists like proponents of the Mill-Frege view cannot adopt this 
suggestion, because the metalinguistic presuppositions we posit involve specific names. What 
is strictly speaking presupposed in referential uses connects the referent with a specific name, 
while, as we have seen, in general in predicative uses no such relation is directly at stake. The 
name-bearing relation that Rami’s proposal assumes, on the other hand, is not presupposed on 
the Mill-Frege view in RU, and hence is not available. Instead, we need to appeal to a 
metalinguistic derivation, as Leckie and Jeshion suggest. This is thus my proposal for the 
relation that underwrites the metonymical transfer: target bears a name articulated as source; 
the source is thus a quotational use of the name.98 This raises the objection from instability 
and context-dependence that, as we have seen, Rami makes. Interestingly, Gray (ms) makes a 
related objection to Rami’s account, a version of which Rami (2015, 426 fn.) discusses. I will 
argue that Rami’s reply in fact suggests a similarly compelling way of dealing with his own 
objection to metalinguistic derivations of predicative uses. 
The objection, in the way that Rami considers it, is that his proposal overgenerates; most 
other expressions which also conventionally express presuppositional/use-conditional 
meanings lack corresponding predicative uses. Thus, in contrast with (15), we cannot out of 
the blue utter ‘there are many yous but few Is/mes here’ to mean that there are many 
addressees but few speakers.99 In reply, Rami (ibid.) plausibly contends that for his proposal 
to work he does not need that ‘every expression that has a use-conditional meaning that 
constrains the adequate contexts of use of such an expression automatically [also has] an 
additional derived predicative use whose truth-conditional content is determined by some 
component of the original constraining condition. It requires an established use of competent 
speakers that exploits the use-conditional meaning … conventionalized by a lexical rule’.  
This is well taken. We have the practice of using names of cities for the governments of 
the countries whose capital they are (‘Vienna will support the proposal’). This is so standard 
that it may make sense to take it as a form of polysemy, explained as a conventionalized form 
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of meaning transfer as suggested above. However, there are many other manifest relations 
that could allow for conventionalized meaning transfers, and can be occasionally used for 
related pragmatic effects, which have never been exploited for any such practice. Thus, there 
are people who have a strong preference for visiting a particular city, and we can easily think 
of contexts in which we could use city names to classify them (‘today we have two Viennas 
and three Barcelonas’, said of participants in a television contest who have to select a trip to a 
city as prize). There could be interesting sociolinguistic explanations for these differences. 
But it is no objection to a Nunbergian explanation of the polysemous character of the one 
based on the city-for-government relation that it overgenerates a non-existent polysemy based 
in the city-for-person-choosing-it.  
However, the proponent of the metalinguistic explanation that I am suggesting for 
predicative uses can say something similar in reply to Rami’s second objection. We should 
agree that (14) has the two readings he mentions in the context that he describes. This is a 
pragmatic fact, as he points out, in that the reading concerning the tokens written on the 
blackboard is only contextually generated. However, on the view I have been articulating here 
a use of a name Ni semantically triggers the presupposition that Ni is calledS Ni, which in its 
turn implies, or allows one to derive (in the way I explained above), that Ni is calledG N. So it 
is not difficult to understand how it can become customary to use a quotation that refers to a 
generic name, in order to metonymically apply it to people who bearG it, and how this can 
become standardized into a lexical rule. Thus, although (14) has two readings in the 
envisaged context, and although perhaps the pragmatic one is the most salient in it, this is 
compatible with there being another not similarly context-dependent reading which has the 
stability that predicative uses have. There might still remain an explanatory cost, as a referee 
pointed out, in that there doesn’t seem to be a standardized procedure to turn homonymous 
expressions such as ‘bank’ into a predicate true of all entities to which it applies in any of 
their senses – although we could create such a predicate ad hoc in special contexts. If this is 
indeed a cost, it should be taken into consideration in a global comparison of the explanatory 
virtues and deficits of each theory. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper I have elaborated and defended a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the 
Mill-Frege view. Like other forms, the Mill-Frege view offers prima facie acceptable answers 
to Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism, and, related, is directly 
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supported by intuitions about entailments and claims such as those illustrated by (5)-(8) at the 
end of §2. Considerations about the semantics of attitude ascriptions and identity statements 
would provide additional support, but I couldn’t go into them here. In separating the role as 
words (to be distinguished from their commonalities as roots, or lexical items) of proper 
names in RU and common names in PU, the view is prima facie more complex than 
predicativism. However, on the proposal made in §7 the additional complexity lies in that the 
two sorts of words, proper and common names, belong in polysemous families, generated on 
the basis of quotational uses of the former. There are good reasons to believe that the 
different strands of this mechanism (quotational uses, type-shifting meaning transfers) are 
exploited elsewhere in the language, and the semantics ascribed to proper names here 
naturally explains why we resort to them in this case; hence, the additional complexity 
involved is well attested, and independently required in a full account of natural languages.  
The presuppositional side of the Mill-Frege proposal (§§3, 5) allows clear-cut responses to 
Kripke’s modal argument, an issue that poses serious trouble for predicativists. Rigidity 
points also in favor of the invidious treatment of names in RU and PU. This is also suggested 
by some of the evidence that predicativists rely on: the fact that, both in English and in other 
languages, when names occur as predicates definites are natural and other determiners are 
marked. Last but not least, predicativists appeal to naming practices (§2) in explicating the 
property that common names signify. But they should be accounted for by positing acts of 
naming that, against what they suggest, have a semantic significance (§4.1). The appellative 
practices such acts create, unlike those for predicates, have a ‘purely nominal character’: they 
are intended to coordinate acts of speaker’s reference by relying on the act of naming itself, 
independently of any further descriptive feature (§4.2). The treatment of ‘Madagascar’-like 
cases in any sensible metasemantics links acts of naming for proper names to acts of 
reference in uses further down the communicative chain to an individual, independently of 
any others that might bear the same generic name. Acts of naming would become Austinian 
‘abuses’ – their effect in constituting semantic reference nullified – if speakers systematically 
intended them for a different (speaker-)referent (§4.1). Acts of naming create thereby words 
specifically designed for use in RU, performing that semantic function independently of 
whether or not others with the same sound or spelling exist in the language. Commonerist 
proposals to explain how the reference of the indexicals or descriptions they assume in RU is 
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1 I assume that definite descriptions are not singular terms, because I take the latter to be 
de jure referential – i.e., it is a semantic requirement (Fine 2007, 50) that they refer – and I 
think that referential uses of descriptions are non-literal (García-Carpintero 1998a). But as 
explained below (fn. 14), nothing in my arguments here hinges on this. 
2 I owe the example to a very helpful anonymous referee. 
3 ‘Millianism does not entail that a proper name has no features that might be deemed, in a 
certain sense, intensional or connotive. Unquestionably, some names evoke descriptive 
concepts in the mind of a user. Some may even have particular concepts conventionally 
attached […]. It does not follow that this connotive aspect of a name belongs to semantics, let 
alone that it affects the propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing the 
name’ (Salmon 1998, 311). 
4 García-Carpintero (2012) provides further discussion, and a particular take on the nature 
of the distinction, which I will rely on below in §4. 
5 In more recent work, Kaplan (ms) questions this, by appealing to a distinction between 
meanings and rules of use; indexicals would be associated with the latter, which somehow 
fall short of constituting fully-fledged descriptive meanings. Cf. Larson & Segal (1996), ch. 
6, and Dorr (2014, 55) on ‘What’s-his-face’, for a similar view. 
6 This is a view with a long historical pedigree: ‘proper names connote the property of 
possessing a name which sounds like the given proper name’ (Lesniewski 1992, 6). (I owe 
the reference to Arianna Betti.) 
7 Thus, in a double-object construction like ‘Maria gave Carlos a book’ both ‘Carlos’ and 
‘a book’ can be passivized, but not ‘Delia’ in ‘we called/dubbed/named her Delia’ 
8 Maier (2015, 323) and Rami (2016, §4.1) concur. Also Fara, who in p.c. tells me that the 
analysis for being called F she intended was this: x calls y F iff x does or says something that 
entails or presupposes that y is in the extension of ‘F’. Cf. also Fara (2015b, 363). 
9 Words have phonological, syntactical and semantic features (Wetzel 2009, 114; 
Bromberger 2011, 499). On the view developed below, §7, names are polysemous; PU are 
related to RU in the way that ‘to google’ is to ‘Google’. On some views of polysemy (Borer, 
2005), lexical items are more abstract than words; they are assigned syntactic category 
externally, by the independently generated syntactic structures that embed them. I will use 
‘root’ for abstract lexical items, and ‘word’ for roots together with the phonological, 
syntactical and semantic features assigned by grammar, however this comes about. 
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10 I take words to be abstract entities – cultural artifacts that serve as ‘model particulars’ 
(Strawson 1959, 232-4) rather than Platonic entities: types, potentially with instances, 
identified by linguistic features as indicated above. No sensible theory can identify linguistic 
types with physical shapes; in physical terms, types are highly disjunctive kinds. Just consider 
morpho-phonological alternation: the occurrence of ‘nation’ in ‘national’ is one of the same 
root that also occurs without the affix, in spite of the altered pronunciation. Words are 
response-dependent kinds, constitutively related to speakers’ recognitional capacities. Kaplan 
(1990) offers what he calls a ‘common currency conception’ of specific names, and says: 
‘utterances and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of these 
interpersonal stages. I want to give up the token/type model in favor of a stage/continuant 
model’ (op. cit., 98). Even though I agree with him that name-words in RU are his ‘specific’ 
names, as opposed to ‘generic’ ones, I stick to the type/token model for both. An essential 
part of our linguistic knowledge is to be described by appeal to types, and to our ability to 
identify their instances (Wetzel 2009, ch. 3, Bromberger 2011, 490). Taking names to be 
specific is compatible with the type-token model (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011, 452): they just 
are types individuated by relational features, in particular by historical ones.  
11 They include Bach (1987, 2002), Geurts (1997) and Katz (1994, 2001), who discuss 
mostly names in RU and take them to be disguised metalinguistic descriptions, and more 
recent the-predicativists like Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008) and Fara (2015). 
12 Maier (2009, 2015), Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998) and Recanati (1993) take names in 
their primary referential uses to be indexicals. On a variabilist variant (Schoubye 
(forthcoming)), names, like pronouns, are variables that refer relative to assignments that can 
be shifted by operators, subject to presuppositional requirements that the assigned object is, 
say, male (‘he’) or called Albert (‘Albert’) (Heim 2008). Perry (2012) argues for a form of 
commoner referentialism that is hard to assimilate to those just mentioned, because he rejects 
that names are indexicals. I discuss his view below, fn. 80. 
13 Cumming’s (2008) view is another. He defends a non-indexical, variabilist form of 
properism. He takes names to be variables, referring like pronouns relative to shiftable 
contextually available assignments, in order to deal with “binding” data – cf. the discussion 
about (10), §5). Like me, he does not take generic ‘Albert’ to have a character as ‘I’ does (op. 
cit., 526, 541-2). Justice’s (2001) view is another example; I’ll discuss it below, fn. 60. 
14 As a referee points out, Quine (1960, §§37-9) appears to defend such a view for his 
regimented language. Perhaps (as Quine suggests) names in utterances like ‘I am/this is Van’ 
are predicates (Bach 2002, 77), understood along properist lines. But the syntactic issues are 
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complex, the context idiosyncratic, and a generalization to other predicative uses would be 
required. I can now explain why I earlier (fn. 1) dismissed the issue whether descriptions have 
a semantic referential use. It is compatible with the view defended here that in RU names are 
predicates accompanied by an unpronounced definite determiner, to the extent that these 
descriptions are understood as de jure referential and it is bearing the specific name that is 
predicated of the referent. The view would still be a properist referentialism, because it is not 
a generic name that occurs as a predicate in referential uses. 
15 As Hinzen (2016) notes, there is a long tradition in syntax (going back to Chomsky’s 
“Aspects”, which Sloat (1969) argues against) for acknowledging these two types of words; 
cf. Longobardi (1994) and Borer (2005, 70-85). (Borer has in the lexicon a common item 
(“listeme”) for homophonic proper and common nouns, but this is a root, not a word, cf. fn. 
9.) As Hinzen also points out, and Delgado (ms-a) and Jeshion (forthcoming, ms) equally 
note, the syntactic evidence is far from clearly supporting the predicativist view on the syntax 
of names, against Matushansky’s (2008) and Fara’s (2015a) claims.  
16 Cf. Burge 1973, 437; Elbourne 2005, 170-1; Fara 2015, 109-112. 
17 Cf. Böer (1975), Delgado (ms-a), Jeshion (2015), Leckie (2013), Rami (2014a), 
Schoubye (forthcoming). 
18 This is the suggestion that Kripke considers and rejects in a footnote to the quoted text; 
I’ll discuss at the end of §5 below his arguments there and in Naming and Necessity. 
19 See Kaplan (1989), for the semantic behavior of those operators. 
20 García-Carpintero (1998a, 1998b, 2000a, 2000b and 2006). 
21 I place ‘demonstrated’ inside scare quotes to acknowledge the point Kaplan (1989, 525, 
fn.) makes with the nice metaphor that the referent of a demonstrative is whoever appears in 
the ‘demonstration platform’; namely, that no explicit demonstration needs to occur. I’ll get 
back to this in the discussion of metasemantics in §4. Cf. King (2014). 
22 As Burge (1979) and Künne (1992) have noted, this was well known to Frege.  
23 My own views, although strongly influenced by him, differ at some points (cf. García-
Carpintero 2015). I take presupposing and referring to be ancillary speech acts, and I think of 
such acts as constitutively normative (García-Carpintero, 2004a, 2015, forthcoming-a); in 
particular, I think of presuppositions as constituted by normative requirements that their 
contents are already common knowledge. I also think that some linguistic presuppositions, in 
particular those we are discussing, are semantically triggered.  
24 This statement of the presupposition contains another presupposition associated with the 
definite description, which I do not unpack further for the sake of perspicuity.  
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25 They are de lingua beliefs, like Fiengo’s & May’s (2006, 62, 86) assignments. Proposals 
along these lines are quite standard nowadays in the linguistic semantics literature; cf. Heim 
(2008), Maier (2010) and Hunter (2012) for related vies.  
26 Singular representations thus understood may fail to have an object; there are, e.g., 
singular presuppositions associated with singular terms in fictions that are merely pretend. 
Our theoretical claims are to be understood as made in the framework of a free logic.  
27 I do not mean to suggest, however, that establishing that indexicals (and names) behave 
like rigid designators is straightforward given a presuppositional account; cf. Hunter (2013) 
and Maier (2015) for discussion.  
28 Millians like Donnellan (1977), Salmon (1987/8) and Soames (2005, 181 ff.) dispute it 
regardless; cf. also the references in fn. 5. Cf. García-Carpintero (2006, 2008) for further 
discussion of the two-dimensional view assumed here. 
29 Cf. Jackson (2010), Kroon (1987), Lewis (1983). Burgess (2012, 448-50) offers a 
metasemantic, reference-fixing version of the metalinguistic descriptivist proposal. 
30 As said above, I endorse normative accounts of speech acts like the one that Williamson 
(2000, ch. 11) has advanced for assertion (García-Carpintero, 2004a, forthcoming-a), both for 
main speech acts and for other ancillary to them such as presupposing and referring. Not to 
overload this paper, however, I will present neutrally my proposal about acts of naming. 
31 In some cases (hiring and firing, marrying, meeting adjourning or sentencing), acts of 
naming are institutionalized – they belong in Austin’s category of exercitives, Searle’s (1975) 
declaratives. A distinctive feature they have is that for their conventional effect to occur, the 
speaker should have ‘some special position, status, or role, as defined by nonlinguistic rules, 
conventions or institutions’ (Alston 2000, 87). But even though such acts of naming are the 
first that come to mind, there are many other (e.g., those for ‘(1)’ or ‘(BCC)’ in this paper, 
nicknames, the seal names in the parable in §5 below; cf. Ziff 1977, 320-1) to which this does 
not apply – except in an undiscriminating wide sense on which the authority of any speaker to 
propose the introduction of a term already puts her in a ‘special’ position.  
32 Cf. Sainsbury (2005, 106-8). 
33 Perry (2012, 117) also speaks of permissive conventions in relation with names, but he 
means something different. He rejects the multiple homonyms view of proper names that I 
adopt from Kaplan and Kripke, in favor of a view on which it is generic names that truly 
name. His naming conventions are permissive in that they allow the use of the generic name 
‘David’ for a particular person; mine concern instead uses of a specific ‘David’.  
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34 Cf. García-Carpintero (2015) for discussion both of the “hey wait a minute” test and of 
the ensuing point about accommodation, and references there. 
35 Perishing practices also attest to the presuppositional character of the metalinguistic 
description, to be articulated in §5. Rami (2014b, 143) points out that ‘Leningrad has more 
than hundred thousand inhabitants’ now sounds bad. In my view, the explanation lies in that 
it is unclear whether the metalinguistic presupposition that there is a ‘Leningrad’ naming 
practice in force is correct: ‘hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know it was still called that’. 
36 As Ziff (1977, 319-321) points out, implicit naming is a very common phenomenon. The 
introduction of nicknames is a case in point. Related, fictional names come with the pretense 
that relevant acts of naming have taken place.  
37 Cf. García-Carpintero (2015) for elaboration and critical discussion. 
38 Cp. Donnellan’s (1966) famous example, ‘Is the king in his countinghouse?’ Cf. Gray’s 
(2014, 223-5) discussion of a ‘practical circularity’ involved here, to which I’ll come back 
below, §6; I have benefited from discussion with him on this point. 
39 Ziff (1977, 322) notes that there are in many countries official restrictions on dubbings; 
an attempt to name one’s child ‘Disgustingfreak’ would fail to meet them. One could succeed 
in initiating a non-official practice with these expressions, but even this can fail, as envisaged 
in the main text; cf. Ziff, op. cit, 321, on the ‘strong glue’ needed for an act of naming to 
initiate a practice, and how the name’s ‘appositeness’ supplies it. Arguing for the view that 
dubbings are exercitives, Mikhail Kissine pointed out to me that even in such cases an 
informed audience will be able to understand what I intend to refer to when I use an 
expression articulating the name I have tried to create. But this just shows that the expression 
has a speaker referent, not that it has become a word endowed with semantic reference.  
40 Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for raising the issue.  
41 No specific name instantiating the template needs to exist, for this to be meaningful; cf. 
the discussion of the ‘Aaron Aardvarks’ example in §5 below.  
42 Wikipedia entry for ‘Madagascar’, accessed 6/11/2015); cf. Burgess (2014, 196). 
43 McKinsey (2011, 330) mentions these cases to argue that acts of naming and causal 
chains based on them are ‘irrelevant’ to determine the referents of names. But this conclusion 
does not follow. The presuppositional data shows that speakers assume acts of naming also in 
those cases. McKinsey (ibid., 336; see also p. 341) in fact gives a prominent role to 
‘individual’ naming practices; he rejects their social character, mentioning cases in which 
someone introduces a name for one’s own use. I of course agree that one can introduce a 
name for one’s own use, but I do not think we need to make any exception for such cases. 
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44 Sainsbury’s helpful discussion of ‘propagation’ (ibid., 204-8) raises similar issues. He 
distinguishes ‘syntactic’ from ‘semantic’ deferential intentions (using the same name as 
others vs. using it with the same meaning). But this is a theoretical artifact; the intuitions 
manifest in data about accommodation and its failure that I have brought up link the two: 
going on in the same semantic way is referring to what was picked out in the originating 
event selected by the syntactic intention to use the name as others do. 
45 Dummett and (following him) Evans and Peacocke insist that senses are presented by 
signifying the referents they determine in canonical ways associated with them. The 
distinction between sentences of the same shape intended as acts of naming, or as meaning-
explanations, figures prominently in the later writings of Wittgenstein. 
46 Evans (1982, 382-3) makes a related claim: “Although many utterances […] in the kind-
term practice have other functions, there will be a subset of utterances involving the term in 
which some particular tree or trees may be said to have been (authoritatively) called by that 
term. It is these utterances involving the term – which may be regarded as the point of contact 
between the practice and the world – that determine which kind the term, as used through the 
practices, refers to.”  
47 This is why commoners also need to individuate generic names not just by perceptual 
features, but by historical ones too; cf. Jeshion (2015, 381fn.), Rami (2014b, 125; 2016, 63). 
48 McKinsey (2011, 336) gives an intriguing example: ‘in some cultures, a person’s “real” 
name is kept secret, known only to a certain religious authority, and it is positively forbidden 
that anyone should ever use that name to refer to the person whose name it is.’ He thinks this 
provides further support for a claim I questioned above (fn. 43), that naming practices are 
irrelevant to determine the referents of names. He does not give details, but I can only make 
sense of the claim that the names are ‘real’ if it is only a subpart of the community (no matter 
how proportionally big) that is forbidden to use them. I assume that the ‘religious authorities’ 
can and do employ them in their secret communicative dealings about the referents. 
49 Fiengo & May (2006, 12) make a related distinction between expressions, which – like 
predicative generic names on the present view – may have different bearers, and their indexed 
occurrences in referential positions in discourses, which are intended to refer to a unique 
individual. Borer (2005, 78-81) also assumes that her abstract, syntactically and semantically 
undifferentiated name-roots (‘listemes’) get an index when they occur in RU in a syntactic 
frame, which indicates an anaphoric relation to a discourse referent – on the present view, this 
would be the one given by the relevant act of naming, see the ‘José María’ example below. 
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50 The rule assumes that for each (specific) name there is a unique act of naming. There are 
objections to this based on alleged cases of multiple baptisms in a single act (as in an example 
ascribed to Hans Kamp, in which a tyrant decrees that all babies born on a given day are to be 
called ‘Vladimir’. Sainsbury (2015, 203) shows in my view that these cases do not contradict 
the assumption after all. 
51  The example comes from Cumming (2008, 535), who refers for earlier examples of this 
sort to Dever’s (1997) dissertation; cf. also Geurts (1997, 321). 
52 A referee makes an interesting objection, which I could best confront at this point: ‘If I 
say that the names in the narrative to follow have been changed to protect the innocent, it is 
then perfectly consistent to say that Arthur (as he appears in the story) is not called Arthur. 
This in turn suggests that it must not be a presupposition of the context that Arthur is called 
Arthur.’ But I do think that this is a presupposition of the relevant context. ‘Arthur’ is in the 
story like ‘(1)’ in this paper; there has been an act of naming, but (in principle at least) a 
short-lived one, relevant only for the discourse in question. The innocent at stake does bear 
‘Arthur’, and also bears his more permanent name; he is both called Arthur (in the story), and 
called that other name, in a wider and more socially significant range of circumstances. When 
we say that Arthur is not called Arthur, we just mean that it is not so-called in the less 
fleeting, more socially significant practice. I’ll discuss related circularity worries below. 
53 The mechanism here is the very same one involved in reference anaphoric on 
indefinites, on which there is a huge literature in discourse-representation theories and 
elsewhere. Cf. Hawthorne & Manley (2012, ch. 4) for a detailed discussion, and an account 
that I sympathize with. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
54 Matushansky (2008, 594, 603-4) raises interesting issues about the relation between full 
names for people, their parts (first and last names), and variants such as standard nicknames 
or diminutives (‘Manolo’ for ‘Manuel’, in my own case.) She claims an advantage for 
predicativism in dealing with them but, as she acknowledges (ibid., 605), the specific account 
she proposes – using a general intersective rule of interpretation for Predicate Modification – 
wrongly entails that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Holmes Sherlock’ have the same meaning. My 
inclination is to think that people primarily receive in acts of naming their full names as 
specific names, on the basis of different rules including decisions by those with the required 
authority in the case of the first name, and social conventions for the last names. There also 
are lexical rules for generic names of people, establishing possibilities to address them by 
their first names in some cases, their last names in others, nicknames, and so on, which are 
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exploited in some cases in dependent or subordinate naming practices. On this view, specific 
cases of ‘Manolo’, ‘García-Carpintero’ and ‘Manuel’ are synonymous (Davis 2005, 239). 
55 Perhaps ‘Hesperus’ is a descriptive name: We call the first luminous body to be seen on 
some days in the year after sunset ‘Hesperus’ would then express an act of naming belonging 
to the practice. However, I share the doubts expressed by Kripke (1979, fn. 43). Goodman 
(2016) objects to the assumption I am making, that participation in communication chains 
involving a name is enough to fully understand the singular thoughts it helps to express. Her 
objections however assume a questionable negative characterization of singular thought, as 
excluding any descriptive identification of their targets. She also ignores the crucial role that 
deference to the speaker’s identification of a specific appellative practice plays, as mentioned 
in the next paragraph in the main text. Last but not least, she doesn’t address the serious 
concerns that her Donnellian position on understanding singular thoughts raises; cf. Jeshion 
(2001) and García-Carpintero (2008). 
56 I share Evans’s (ibid., 374) intuitions concerning his ‘Jack Jones’ example; cf. my 
criticism below of Rami’s (2014b) indexicalist views, fn. 85. 
57 I fully agree with Perry’s (2012, 170-181) account of the role of names in ‘conditional 
networks of co-reference’, in spite of the disagreement about whether names are specific or 
generic that I have already mentioned and will discuss further below, fn. 80. McKinsey is 
wrong to object to causal theories (1984, 501-3) that they wrongly turn names into indexicals. 
His argument conflates two sorts of properties that our rules invoke. There are, in the first 
place, Peirce’s ‘existential properties’ invoked in rules for indexicals (the place and time in 
which tokens occur, the producer, contiguous objects and so on), which not two tokens are to 
be expected to share just by virtue of being of the same type. Then there are properties like 
the appellative practice to which a token belongs; these might be legitimately appealed to in 
rules intended for anaphoric devices like proper names (types) and common nouns. 
58 As acknowledged, establishing that indexicals and names behave like rigid designators 
given a presuppositional account is not trivial; cf. Hunter (2013) and Maier (2015). Burgess 
(2012) defends a Millian metasemantic form of metalinguistic descriptivism. He criticizes 
Geurts’ (1997) presuppositional proposal to handle the modal argument. He is right that just 
having the metalinguistic condition contributing to a presupposition is not enough to solve the 
problem. But properly developed the presuppositional account does have the resources to deal 
with the modal argument. Consider the modal disparity between ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of 
“Aristotle”’ and ‘the bearer of “Aristotle” is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’. Burgess wonders 
how, on a presuppositional account, the former can correctly describe a possible situation – 
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one such that Aristotle doesn’t bear the name he does in actuality: after all, the claim ‘has a 
false presupposition in this sort of situation [… it] effectively presupposes its own negation’ 
(2012, 454, my italics). But we must disambiguate ‘this sort of situation’. The presupposition 
is to be met at the world of the context where the utterance is made; the name might not exist 
in worlds with respect to which the assertoric content is true, or someone else might bear it 
there, while Aristotle bears a different name or is nameless. A two-dimensional account along 
these lines is not very different from the one that Burgess provides, by appealing to Adams’ 
(1981) well-known distinction between propositions true at a world and those true in a world. 
Burgess contends that the appeal to presuppositions is at the very least superfluous; but I have 
been providing independent motivation for it. I also think it provides a better, more general 
justification than Burgess’ for resorting to something like Adams’ distinction. 
59 Rothschild (2007) spots a relevant distinction in the discourse role of definite 
descriptions, which he thereby classifies as ‘role-type’ vs. ‘particularized’. In typical uses of 
those in the former category (‘the mayor’, ‘the president’), it is common ground that there is 
one potentially different person satisfying the descriptive content across a range of possible 
situations; not so in typical uses of the latter. The distinction might explain why particularized 
descriptions are typically understood in discourse as rigid, while role-type are understood as 
non-rigid. This suggests a line for metalinguistic descriptivists to deal with the rigidity data, 
for such descriptions are in normal contexts particularized. An account in these terms predicts 
however that names would get narrow readings in contexts in which corresponding 
metalinguistic descriptions are role-type, and as a result do easily get narrow-scope reading; 
cf. Schoubye (2016, §4) and references there for discussion. I am unclear that they do. 
60 Justice’s (2001) account makes names synonymous to metalinguistic descriptions, and 
as a result has also difficulties in accounting for the rigidity data. He (ibid., 362) argues that 
‘a name with any other bearer would be another name with its own origin in the naming of 
that other bearer. Having the bearer it has is an essential property of a name’. I doubt this; but 
be it as it may, I do not see how it follows from it that ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of 
“Aristotle”’ ‘is not true and could not have been true’. Justice’s reason is that ‘[t]here is no 
circumstance in which a name designates anything other than its bearer’ (ibid). But even if 
this is so, there are circumstances in which Aristotle exists, while the dubbing introducing his 
actual specific name fails to do so – he is nameless, or bears some other name. Justice argues 
‘it is not possible that Aristotle exist in a circumstance and not be the referent of “Aristotle” 
when it is evaluated with respect to that circumstance’ (p. 364). But even if in those 
circumstances Aristotle is the referent of our specific name when evaluated with respect to 
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them, he fails to bear the name there, as indicated. Justice is here overlooking Adams’ (1981) 
distinction between claims true at a world and claims true in a world; cf. also Burgess 2012, 
and fn. 58 above. This suffices for ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’ to be true with 
respect to such a world, and it establishes the truth at the actual world of ‘Aristotle might not 
have been the bearer of “Aristotle”’. 
61 García-Carpintero (2006, 2008) presents a form of two-dimensionalism that allows for a 
more positive version of the suggested reply to the epistemological argument. Cf. also 
Chalmers’ (2014, 254-6) discussion of these issues. 
62 McKinsey’s (1984, 2011) partially similar ‘private rule’ proposal is also challenged by 
the example below in the main text. McKinsey’s is a descriptive theory that appeals in some 
but not all cases to metalinguistic descriptions. Cases in which the view relies on other 
descriptions that a particular speaker associates with a name would allow for a similar 
conflation of speaker’s referent and semantic referent. This discussion anticipates the critical 
examination in §6.3 of Rami’s (2014b) recent related but more sophisticated ‘pluralist’ view. 
63 Cf. Bach (1987, 159-161; 2002, 83), Katz (1990, 39-41), Geurts (1997, 326), Elbourne 
(2005, 177), Recanati 1993, 158-9. 
64 These points also apply in the ‘Arthur’ example discussed in fn. 52 above; uses of the 
name in the relevant discourse are not circular either, in the way that my uses of ‘(1)’ aren’t. 
Cf. fn. 77 below for an example of a view on name bearing which, unlike the one developed 
here, is circular in Kripke’s sense and clearly objectionable because of that. 
65 See the illuminating remarks in this regard by Loar (1976, IX). Kripke’s proposal, as 
already indicated and as he makes clear (1980, 97), is not reductive either; it uses reference at 
least at two points: in the account of baptisms, and in that of name-transmission. 
66 Cf. Justice (2001, 358). 
67 Of course, the person making the Hey, wait a minute objection manifests thereby 
competence with predicative uses of expressions, but it is not in question here that all names, 
including those at stake, have predicative uses.  
68 Dolf Rami suggested to me this explanation. One of the claims that Cohen (1980, 144) 
invokes against properism (what he calls the ‘idiosyncratic’ view of name-individuation) goes 
as follows: ‘it is far from being the case, as the idiosyncratic conception implies, that a 
natural-language proper name normally has a unique designation, or that in an ideal natural 
language it would have one. Just the opposite. It would be a real imperfection in a natural 
language to prohibit the reuse of any proper name’, emphasis in the original. But the practical 
reasons he mentions in support are manifestly extralinguistic. 
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69 Noticing this, Recanati (1993, 142) appears to go for an eccentric indexicalism, on 
which it is only some abstract feature common to all proper names that has a character. He 
himself (ibid., 139) points out the main difficulty for this: indexicalists, like friends of 
metalinguistic descriptivism in general, want something more specifically related to different 
names to be (also) known as part of linguistic competence. Hence I take his considered view 
to be that of other indexicalists such as Maier (2015) or Schoubye (forthcoming), namely, that 
it is generic names that are indexicals like ‘she’ with a Kaplanian character. 
70 I will discuss only true arguments, as opposed to question-begging unsupported claims. 
Take this assertion by Cohen (1980, 145): ‘Learning the given names of our new neighbors, 
or even their full names, does not necessarily add anything to our knowledge of English: we 
might well have known already that the names John and Mary … are English names’. But 
learning their names allows us to refer to them in a particularly suitable way, which is one of 
the main functions one can take languages to be tools for. I’ll say more about names and the 
individuation of languages below. 
71 Such reasons would be articulated differently by the different views at stake. For 
properists, the aim is to ease the ‘presemantic’ task of discriminating among homonyms. (In 
its presemantic role, context is ‘regarded as determining what word was used’ rather than as 
‘fixing the content of a single context-sensitive word’ (Kaplan 1989, 562).) For commoners, 
the goal rather is to facilitate the identification of the relevant contextual parameter 
72 Cf. Wetzel (2009, 114), Bromberger (2011, 503); cp. Schoubye (forthcoming, 16). 
73 One of the late Oliver Sacks’s last poignant articles contains this nice example: ‘I 
misheard “tonsillitis” as “pontillitis”, … a nonexistent word’. ‘Mishearings’, New York Times 
5/6/2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/oliver-sacks-mishearings.html?_r=0 
(downloaded September 5 2015). 
74 I appeal to Nunberg’s work in my account of quotation (García-Carpintero 2004b, 
forthcoming-b), as I’ll do below to account for predicative uses of names. 
75 Cf. also the wonderful ‘Katherine’ example from John Green’s novel An Abundance of 
Katherines in Jeshion (2015, 381 fn.). 
76 Their individuation might also include historical/etymological features; cf. Jeshion 
(2015, 381 fn.), Rami (2014b, 125; 2016, 63). 
77 Maier’s (2015, 315) explanation of the apriority of Albert is called Albert seems to 
presuppose this inadequate understanding of ‘being called’: ‘arguably, knowing the truth of a 
statement like [‘Albert is called Albert’] does not require any empirical justification: uttering 
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[it] is like a self-fulfilling prophecy, by saying it you are calling him thus, which makes it 
true’. This makes him vulnerable to Kripke’s circularity objection, as indicated in fn. 64. 
78 Maier (2015, 317) and Schoubye (forthcoming, §2.2) also appear to have this feature in 
mind; they appeal to the contextually relevant object bearing the (generic) name, or being 
called by it, although they do not develop the proposal at any length.  
79 Matushansky (2008, 592-4) refers to Recanati, but she argues that naming conventions 
are relations between multiple bearers and multiple phonological strings: the same naming 
convention links many individuals to, say, (generic) ‘Bob’, ‘Robert’ and ‘Robert Smith’. I 
cannot make sense of the contextual salience that according to her allows speakers to select a 
particular referent (ibid.,, 595, 599), unless she assumes that the unique naming convention 
linking multiple individuals with several names is after all grounded on, or can be somehow 
subdivided into, multiple conventions assigning names to specific individuals. But if so, her 
view is subject to the objections raised against Recanati. 
80 I can now comment on Perry’s view – the closest to my own, which was influenced by 
his work. The main difference lies in that he wants to consider words only generic names, not 
specific ones. But otherwise his claims (cf. the summary in Perry 2012, 116-9) are very 
similar to the ones I have been making. He also takes the metalinguistic descriptive content of 
names to be use-reflexive. And he also locates such contents at a different level than that of 
‘at issue’ representational acts, although he does not resort to the notion of presupposition. He 
rejects the assimilation of names to indexicals with a character, with considerations similar to 
the ones I have been providing here and in §6.1. He counts generic names as ambiguous, 
although he registers differences with the ambiguity of homonyms like ‘bank’ by coining 
‘nambiguity’ for the one of proper names, invoking the kind of (bad, I argued in §6.2) 
arguments that commonerist use against properism (2012, 118 fn). This entails nonetheless 
that specific names are also words, I contend; even more given that he reserves a crucial 
semantic relation for them and the objects they stand for in RU, which he calls ‘reference’ 
(2012, 117). Delgado (ms-b) articulates and defends a ‘polyreferential’ view of names, which 
might be a nice defense and elaboration of Perry’s account. 
81 McKinsey (2011, 337-340) reproduces the usual philosophical arguments why proper 
names are not words of any language; he goes on to defend the to me self-contradictory claim 
that names are non-words that nonetheless have not just speakers referents, but semantic 
referents (341). Davis (2005, 233-245) provides a thorough refutation of such arguments.  
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82 This is in fact not the case, as we saw above: the name a corrupt form of which became 
our ‘Madagascar’ is the one currently articulated as ‘Mogadishu’. Both dubbings are thus in 
force in current contexts, and hence the ‘salience’ condition below will have to be invoked. 
83 Cf. also Tiedke (2011, 714-5). 
84 Cf. Rami (2014b) and Sainsbury (2015). Davis (2005, 257-61) also makes the objection. 
85 Evans’s (1982, 374) ‘Jack Jones’ example, which has been bestowed in the relevant 
community upon two individuals who look alike and are regularly confused, raises a similar 
issue. I agree with Evans’s diagnosis that in such a case the name lacks a semantic referent. 
On the first horn of the dilemma, Rami must reject this diagnosis, because in particular 
contexts his conditions for demonstrative or descriptive identification will be fulfilled, and 
both are bearers of the generic name. Cohen’s account (1980, 160) has the same problems. 
Let me grant however that these cases are complicated, and intuitions about them less clear-
cut than I make them seem. They deserve both deeper critical scrutiny, and also empirical test 
– cf. for related issues about cases of conflicting intentions King (2013) and Speaks (2017). 
86 Rami (2016, 69-70) offers a new account of naming practices allegedly consistently with 
his commonerism. As we have seen, on his account naming practices do not fix the referent 
of a use of a given (generic) name; they merely constraint it. Further acts (demonstrations, 
descriptive appositions), contribute also to determining the referent. However, in order to 
articulate the constraint provided by naming practices, he now disregards the full historical 
practice related to a generic name, focusing on what he calls ‘conventionalized branches’. As 
far as I can tell, the objections to Recanati and others raised above (which he shares) apply 
thus also to him, because for all purposes these ‘branches’ create specific names. 
87 Rami’s account (2014b, 148-9) is also unnecessarily complex. His conditions (b) and (c) 
are intended to deal with cases that should be accounted for as instances of accommodation 
and its failure, cp. the discussion of cases of inexplicit dubbings and cases involving perishing 
practices in §4.1, especially fn. 35. This establishes the advantages of a presuppositional 
account over the Predellian one that Rami assumes. 
88 I have suggested a related model to explain the generation of different interpretations for 
quotations, in the framework of a demonstrative account (García-Carpintero, 2004b). 
89 Cf. Bach & Harnish 1979, 192-5 on standardization. Leckie (2013, 1150-1) and Jeshion 
(2015, 386-8) provide some suggestions on criteria for the polysemy view. 
90 Cf. also Gray ms, §3.2, and Rami 2015, 416-418. 
91 Cp. Bach 1987, 146-7. 
92 Cp. Elbourne 2005, 181-3. 
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93 I use scare quotes because I take the quotations in question to refer to generic names, at 
least typically (predicative uses in sentences such as ‘I am/he is Barack Obama’ might be 
exceptions), which as we have seen in §6.3 need not be words.  
94 De Brabanter (2002) provides many similar examples: ‘They use the editorial “we”...’; 
‘Think of it [...] as the nameless Subject of so much that happens, like the It in “It is raining”’. 
Objecting to the metalinguistic account of the meaning-transfer below, Laura Delgado and 
Dolf Rami pointed out to me that ‘An “Alfred Russell” joined the club today’ sounds odd, 
unlike (3). But as I say below, I take the transfer to have become conventionalized, like others 
(literary work for a copy thereof, tree for fruit and otherwise). The generic name has become 
a conventional term for bearers of specific names articulating it; the use of a quotation for the 
same goal has not a similarly conventional status, even if such uses explain (by meaning-
transfer standardization) the constitution of the conventional predicative use. 
95 Gray (ms., §3.2) has a similar objection. 
96 As indicated in §6.3, Rami assumes Predelli’s (2013) framework. 
97 Cohen (1980, 150) refers to a discussion in the OED of examples like ‘that cat is a he’. 
98 The relevant quotation is assumed to refer to the generic name, and the transfer relation 
involves specific names articulating it, if there are any. 
99 But there are contexts in which we can felicitously say such things. I distribute tasks 
among my colleagues and myself: you will do X, I’ll take care of Y, you will do Z … . One 
of them complains: “as usual, far too many yous and too few mes in your task assignments”. 
100 A version of this paper was written in the mid 1990’s, and given at talks and 
conferences then; García-Carpintero (2000) was originally part of it, and briefly sketches it. 
After hapless publication efforts, I decided that the material could only be published in a 
monograph. Recently I realized that, although many of the original ideas have by now been 
defended by others (the presuppositional account of reference-fixing and sense by Maier, 
Hawthorne & Manley and others, the grounding on primitive singular reference by Elbourne 
and Hawthorne & Manley, the appeal to naming practices by Sainsbury and others), it still 
holds original takes on the different aspects of the problem and on how they fit together; and 
also that it could be fruitfully compared with the now popular related predicativist accounts. 
Earlier drafts of the current version of the paper were presented at the PhiLang2015, 
University of Łódź, BCAP2015, University of Bucharest, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
Universität Göttingen, 2º Congresso Português de Filosofia, Porto, SEFA 2016, Oviedo, and 
LOGOS Seminar. There are many people I should thank for very useful suggestions; I’ll just 
mention Philippe de Brabanter, Gregory Bochner, Aurélien Darbellay, Martin Davies, Laura 
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Delgado, José Antonio Díez, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Aidan Gray, Mikhail Kissine, Wolfgang 
Künne, Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí, Michael McKinsey, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Pagin, 
Manuel Pérez, Dolf Rami, Sven Rosenkranz, Marco Santambroggio, Ernest Sosa and Mark 
Textor. I am very much indebted to comments and suggestions by the editors and referees for 
this journal. Thanks also to Michael Maudsley for his grammatical revision. Financial support 
for my work was provided by the DGI, Spanish Government, research project FFI2013-
47948-P, and through the award ICREA Academia for excellence in research, 2013, funded 
by the Generalitat de Catalunya, and from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and 
Innovation program under Grant Agreement no. 675415, Diaphora. 
